160 McKIM r. THOMPSON.—1 BLAND.

a "decretal order" or not, was neither mentioned in argument,
nor considered by the Court. The investigation of the nature of
the basis of such an order being a matter of much importance, was
however, made with great care; because, upon its being ascer-
tained, whether that basis was solid and uniform, or loose and
shifting, depended the very interesting question presented in that
argument—whether such orders were likely to be attended with
good or ill consequences; or whether they were, or were not
172 * capable of being used as instruments of oppression''. And
it was. on finding that the authorities required the most
broad and solid foundation, no less clear and strong than that of a
final decree itself, that the Court was perfectly convinced of their
great utility in all cases where there was a proper foundation for
making them, and that they were no more capable of being
abused, or applied to improper purposes, than final decrees them-
selves.

But the foundation, or basis of an order, does not determine its
effect upon the controversy or the parties. An admitted, or incon-
trovertible state of facts, is required as the foundation of an order
to bring money into Court. As the foundation of an order to
account, it must appear that a computation is necessary relative to
the matter on which the Court may be called on to decree; and to
lay a proper foundation for an order to pay money out of Court, the
party claiming it must show a clear title in himself. But no infer-
ence can be deduced from the nature of the basis of an order as to
its true character, that is, whether it be interlocutory or final, a
decretal order, or otherwise. Such questions can only be deter-
mined by the order itself, considered in all its relations and bear-
ings upon the parties and upon the case.

Whether an appeal can be allowed, as moved for, must depend
altogether upon, whether the order of the 12th of February last
is or is not a "decretal order," within the true intent and mean-
ing of the Act of 1818, ch. 193, s. 1. The English authorities
explain, with tolerable accuracy, the difference between interlocu-
tory and final decrees in Chancery, but the phrase, "decretal
order," seems to be variously applied, and to have no settled or
distinct meaning or application. The term "order" is almost
always used in speaking of those general or special directions by
which all suits in Chancery are governed, controlled, or facilitated
throughout, or in the course of their progress from beginning to
end; and, the term "decree" is most generally applied to the
decisions of the Court upon some or all of the rights of the liti-
gating parties. Hence it would seem, that a "decretal order''
can only be such an order as finally determines some right between
the parties.

But we have a satisfactory and conclusive authority of our own
State upon this question. The Court of Appeals, in the case of