140 McKIM v. THOMPSON.—1 BLAND.

practice, so as to postpone the payment of the trustee's commis-
sion until the whole of his duties had been performed, or to author-
ize summary proceedings to be instituted, to make his representa-
tives refund in part, with which the succeeding trustee may be
compensated for his trouble in collecting the balance. Under such
circumstances, it seems to be fair, by way of analogy to the rule
laid down by the Legislature in regard to sheriffs and others;
1795, ch. 88, s. 6; 1813, ch. 102, s. 5; Bac. Abr. tit. Sheriff, (I;)
to apportion the commission or poundage, where it can be done,
between the preceding and succeeding trustee according to the
sum which each may have collected, or on a consideration of the
trouble and merits of each. But in this case the fund has been
already charged with full commissions; and therefore should not
now be again charged with more than a necessary recompense to
the present trustee for his trouble; which in this, as in all similar
cases, must be regulated according to the service actually ren-
dered.

Whereupon, it is ordered, that this trustee be, and he is hereby
allowed half commissions on the amount stated to have been re-
ceived byhim.

McKIM v. THOMPSON.

ORDES TO BEING MONEY INTO COURT.—SUPPLEMENTAL ANSWER.—EIGHT OF

APPEAL.

To obtain an order upon a defendant to bring money into Court, before the
final hearing, it must appear, that he who asks for such an order has an
interest in the money proposed to be called in; and that he who has it
in his hands has no equitable right to it: and the facts from which this
appears must be found in the case as it then stands, either admitted or
so established as to be open to no further controversy at any subsequent
stage of the proceedings, (a)

A defendant cannot be allowed to put in a supplemental answer, except
under very special circumstances.

The defendant must move to put in a supplemental answer, and accompany
the motion with an affidavit, in which he must swear that when he put
in the answer, he did not know the circumstances upon which he ap-

(a) Affirmed in Dillon v. Ins. Co. 44 Md. 394; Contee v. Dawson. 2 Bland,
266. 269; Hopkins v. McEldery, 4 Md. Ch. 24, Cited in Smith v. Anderson,
18 Md. 528. In Dillon v. Ins. Co. supra, the Court said, in concluding its
opinion, that "though the practice of ordering money into Court has become
one of the most ordinary methods by which the Court enforces its jurisdic-
tion of preserving property in dispute pending a litigation, there are certain
well-defined restrictions and limitations upon it, which Courts of equity
should always be careful to observe. These limitations are well stated in
the cases in our own State to which we have referred." See Thompson v.
McKim, 6 H. & J. 303.