COALE v. CHASE.—1 BLAND. 127

statement of the belief of the parties, not upon their allegations of
fact. But it is the iaw arising out of the facts, not merely from
the belief of the parties, which is to be determined. Beams' PL
Eq. 26. Tet where an injunction has been granted against an
executor or administrator, it is sufficient for him, in order to obtain
a dissolution of it, to state, as to any facts, in regard to which the
bill calls for an answer, and which must, from the nature of things,
have rested in the knowledge of his testator or intestate, that they
are as he "is informed and verily believes," so and so. Carnan v.
Vansant, Adm'r, MS. 1807. But the answer of this defendant, in
the body of it, has spoken so distinctly and positively as to the
facts; and thus, so entirely sworn away the equity of the bill, that
I could have no hesitation in dissolving the injunction, at once,
were it not for an objection to the form of the affidavit thereunto
annexed by which it has been verified. In that affidavit the de-
fendant swears, " that the several matters and facts set forth and
stated in the within and aforegoing answer are just and true as
they are therein stated, according to the best of her knowledge,
belief, and recollection.'" This the plaintiff's allege is too vague,
indefinite, and general.

Regularly the affidavit, in all such cases, should assert, "that
the i'acts within the defendant's own knowledge are true, and that
those facts not within his own knowledge he believes to be true.''
But here, there has been, as far back as has fallen within my
observation, a very great neglect of all regularity in the forms of
such affidavits; and therefore, I should not feel myself authorized;
at once, to depart from even so improper a practice as to require,
in such affidavits, more than a substantial sufficiency. As to which
I know of no better test than, that they must be so absolute and
positive, when taken in connection with the body of the answer,
as to subject the party to a prosecution for perjury, if the matters
stated in the answer should be false. It is now well settled, that
if a man swears he believes that to be true which he knows to be
false, he swears as absolutely, and is as criminal, and may be prose-
cuted and punished for perjury in like manner, as if he had made
a positive assertion. Okitt, Grim. Law, 305: 1 Hatck. P. C. c. 69,
s. 7; Miller's Case, 3 Wilson, 427. The affidavit to this answer is
not as correctly expressed as it ought to have been; but when taken
in * connexion with the whole answer, I deem it substantially
sufficient; because if any of the allegations of the answer are 138
false, the defendant will be as clearly liable to a prosecution for
perjury as if the affidavit had been couched in the most positive
terms. 2 Chitt. Crim. Law, 392; Beams' Pl. Eq. 27; Drew v.
Drew, 2 Ves. & E. 159.

Whereupon it is ordered, that the injunction heretofore granted
in this case, be and the same is hereby dissolved.