BURGH v. SCOTT.—1 BLAND. 111

attain it, is, by what they call "a supplemental bill, in the nature
of a bill of review." Whatever may be the cause of complaint,
the party asking relief must conform, at least in substance, to pre-
scribed rules as to time and manner.

It has been the long established usage and law of the Court of
Chancery, to consider all its orders and decrees, as completely
within its control and opened to be altered, revised, or revoked
during the whole term at which they are passed, on motion or by
petition. But, if the term is suffered to elapse, the party can only
obtain relief bj original bill, or by a bill of review. Mussel v.
Morgan, 3 Bro. C. C. 74; Cameron v. McRoberts, 3 'Wheat. 591.
This law of this Court is analogous to that which has been adopted
by the Courts of common law; and which has been found alike
salutary in both. It is believed there is no decision of the Court
of Appeals, which has directly or distinctly restricted or altered
this rule of the Court of Chancery. But in this case, the bill of
these plaintiff's was not filed until long after the close of the term
at which the decree was signed. It cannot, therefore, be consid-
ered as entitled to the same indulgence, or as standing altogether
on the footing of a petition, for a rehearing, or alteration, or open-
ing of a decree, filed during the term at which the decree was
signed.

This bill charges, that the decree of the 4th of August last was
obtained by fraud. It is the peculiar province of this Court to
grant relief in all cases against fraud and accident, not within
reach of the Courts of common law; and a decree obtained with-
out making those parties, whose rights are affected by it, is, as to
them, fraudulent. Giffard v. Hort, 1 Scho. & Lefr. 386. And
there can be no case of fraud, in which it would be more fit and
proper for this Court to interfere, than upon a charge, that its own
decree had been obtained by fraud. Such a case is, however,
brought before the Court, not by a bill of review, but by an origi-
nal bill. 1 Mont. Dig. 345. And in that light, the allegations of
this bill require the Court, in some respects, to consider it.

In the Court of Chancery of England, the Chancellor, it seems,
after the hearing, pronounces the substance of his decree orally;
Kennedy v. Daly, 1 *Scho. & Lefr. 384; Giffard v. Hort, 1 Scho. &
Lefr. 390; minutes of which are taken down bj the register, who
afterwards draws them out into the form of a decretal order; and
if, in doing so, any mistake should occur, the execution of the
order may be * stayed awhile, until it can be corrected by
motion in Court. As thus drawn up, this judgment of the 121
Court is always called its ''decretal order." But it has the force
only of an interlocutory order; and is not a perfect, complete, and
final decree before enrolment; for, till then the Chancellor may
re-hear, alter, or revise it. The proper officer draws up the form
of the decree for enrolment, from the decretal order, reciting all