dent of the convention. Affirming an
order which dissolved an injunction in
favor of the plaintiff, the court pointed
out that the legislature never intended
or attempted to provide a printer for
the constitutional convention, but added
that if it had, "it would have been an
unauthorized and unwarrantable inter-
ference with the rights of that body,"
saying: "The admission of such a right
in the legislature would place the con-
vention under its entire control, leaving
it without authority even to appoint or
elect its own officers, or adopt measures
for the transaction of its legitimate busi-
ness. It would have less power than a
town meeting, and be incompetent to
perform the objects for which it con-
vened. It would be absurd to suppose a
constitutional convention had only such
limited authority. It is the highest legis-
lative assembly recognized in law, in-
vested with the right of enacting or
framing the supreme law of the state.
It must have plenary power for this, and
over all the incidents thereof. The fact
that the convention assembled by au-
thority of the legislature renders it in no
respect inferior thereto, as it may well
be questioned whether, had the legisla-
ture refused to make provision for call-
ing a convention, the people, in their
sovereign capacity, would not have had
the right to take such measures for fram-
ing and adopting a Constitution as to
them seemed meet. At all events, there
can be no doubt but that, however
called, the convention has full control
of all its proceedings, and may provide,
in such manner as it sees fit, to per-
petuate its records, either by printing or
manuscript, or may refuse to do either."
* * «
In a few cases the power of the legis-
lature to limit the powers of a consti-
tutional convention by specific provi-
sions in the law authorizing the assem-
354
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blage of such convention has been de-
nied although under the particular facts
involved it was not necessary for the
court to decide the question. Sproule v.
Fredericks, 69 Miss. 898, 11 So. 472
(1892); Loomis v. Jackson, 6 W. Va.
613 (1873).
In Sproule v. Fredericks, 69 Miss. 898,
11 So. 472 (1892), the validity of a
Constitution adopted by a constitutional
convention was challenged, inter alia,
on the ground that the Constitution had
never been submitted to or ratified by
the people, it being noteworthy that no
such requirement was contained in the
act calling the constitutional conven-
tion. In sustaining the validity of the
new Constitution the court observed
that the case at bar was "free from the
difficulties which are supposed by some
writers to arise out of a failure or refusal
of a constitutional convention to yield
to the direction of the legislature which
summoned it that the Constitution
framed shall be submitted to the people
for ratification," but added: "The the-
orizing of the political essayist and the
legal doctrinaire, by which it is sought
to be established that the expression of
the will of the legislature shall fetter and
control the constitution-making body,
. . . will be found to degrade this sov-
ereign body below the level of the lowest
tribunal clothed with ordinary legisla-
tive powers. This theorizing will reduce
that great body, which, in our own state
at least, since the beginning of its exist-
ence, except for a single brief interval
in an exceptional period, by custom and
the universal consent of the people, has
been regarded as the repository and
executor of the powers of sovereignty,
to a mere commission, stripped of all
power, and authorized only to make a
recommendation."
In Loomis v. Jackson, 6 W. Va. 613
(1873), there was involved an election
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