dent of the convention. Affirming an order which dissolved an injunction in favor of the plaintiff, the court pointed out that the legislature never intended or attempted to provide a printer for the constitutional convention, but added that if it had, "it would have been an unauthorized and unwarrantable interference with the rights of that body," saying: "The admission of such a right in the legislature would place the convention under its entire control, leaving it without authority even to appoint or elect its own officers, or adopt measures for the transaction of its legitimate business. It would have less power than a town meeting, and be incompetent to perform the objects for which it convened. It would be absurd to suppose a constitutional convention had only such limited authority. It is the highest legislative assembly recognized in law, invested with the right of enacting or framing the supreme law of the state. It must have plenary power for this, and over all the incidents thereof. The fact that the convention assembled by authority of the legislature renders it in no respect inferior thereto, as it may well be questioned whether, had the legislature refused to make provision for calling a convention, the people, in their sovereign capacity, would not have had the right to take such measures for framing and adopting a Constitution as to them seemed meet. At all events, there can be no doubt but that, however called, the convention has full control of all its proceedings, and may provide, in such manner as it sees fit, to perpetuate its records, either by printing or manuscript, or may refuse to do either."

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In a few cases the power of the legislature to limit the powers of a constitutional convention by specific provisions in the law authorizing the assemblage of such convention has been denied although under the particular facts involved it was not necessary for the court to decide the question. *Sproule v. Fredericks,* 69 Miss. 898, 11 So. 472 (1892); *Loomis v. Jackson,* 6 W. Va. 613 (1873).

In *Sproule v. Fredericks,* 69 Miss. 898, 11 So. 472 (1892), the validity of a Constitution adopted by a constitutional convention was challenged, inter alia, on the ground that the Constitution had never been submitted to or ratified by the people, it being noteworthy that no such requirement was contained in the act calling the constitutional convention. In sustaining the validity of the new Constitution the court observed that the case at bar was "free from the difficulties which are supposed by some writers to arise out of a failure or refusal of a constitutional convention to yield to the direction of the legislature which summoned it that the Constitution framed shall be submitted to the people for ratification," but added: "The theorizing of the political essayist and the legal doctrinaire, by which it is sought to be established that the expression of the will of the legislature shall fetter and control the constitution-making body, . . . will be found to degrade this sovereign body below the level of the lowest tribunal clothed with ordinary legislative powers. This theorizing will reduce that great body, which, in our own state at least, since the beginning of its existence, except for a single brief interval in an exceptional period, by custom and the universal consent of the people, has been regarded as the repository and executor of the powers of sovereignty, to a mere commission, stripped of all power, and authorized only to make a recommendation."

In *Loomis v. Jackson,* 6 W. Va. 613 (1873), there was involved an election