of his recommendations by the legislature,
whose members were free to adopt, alter
or entirely ignore any or all of them,
except insofar as the governor, by virtue
of his prestige and his influence with the
members of the legislature, might affect
the course of his recommendations
through the legislature. The governor re-
tained his power under Article II, Section
17 to veto any appropriation bill of which
he disapproved; however, political reali-
ties required that he exercise this power
sparingly.
In earlier times when the range and
scope of State activities were limited,
this procedure was not seriously objec-
tionable for it was not impossible for
members of the legislature to have a fairly
clear grasp of the State's financial opera-
tions. The eventual growth in the size
and complexity of governmental pro-
grams and machinery resulted, however,
in embarrassing deficits. In addition, it
was not unusual for excessive appropria-
tions to result from the political pressure
of lobbyists and from "logrolling" tactics
among members of the General Assembly
who sought to ensure passage of some
measure in which they had an interest.
Other important needs of the State were
consequently overlooked or given inade-
quate consideration.
A particularly disturbing experience
occurred in 1915 when there resulted a
deficit of $2,000,000 in the state treasury.
Shortly thereafter, the governor ap-
pointed a commission headed by Dr.
Frank J. Goodnow to study possible solu-
tions to the problem. This commission
proposed the institution of a carefully
devised executive budget system, and the
General Assembly and the people passed
the necessary constitutional amendment.
The amendment required the careful and
centralized examination of requests for
funds before they were submitted to the
General Assembly for appropriations and
232
|
for checking the total of proposed expen-
ditures against revenue estimates. Partly
because this task could not be performed
during the brief period when the legis-
lature was in session and also because it
needed to be done by officers familiar
with the needs of the several administra-
tive agencies, responsibility for operating
the system was placed upon the governor.
The "Goodnow Commission" stated
the purpose of the system to be
"to impose upon the governor the
sole responsibility ... of presenting to
the legislature a complete and compre-
hensive statement of the needs and re-
sources of the State ... ; to make it
impossible for the legislature so to
change the plans proposed by the gov-
ernor as to produce a deficit; but . . .
to permit the legislature to make pro-
vision for any purpose not included in
the governor's plan on the condition
that it provide for the revenue which
the accomplishment of its purpose
necessitates."2
Article III, Section 52 contains gen-
erally the following features. The gov-
ernor shall submit to the General As-
sembly at the beginning of each year a
complete plan of proposed expenditures
and estimated revenues for the following
year, together with a thorough report
of the current financial condition of the
State and a bill providing for all proposed
appropriations . The General Assembly
may not increase any of the appropria-
tions set forth in the bill, but it may strike
out or reduce items therein. The bill as
finally passed by the General Assembly
becomes law immediately, and, therefore,
is not subject to the governor's veto. After
the budget bill has been finally acted
upon by both houses of the General As-
sembly, additional appropriations may be
2 md. S. jour. 133 (January session, 1916).
|
