of his recommendations by the legislature, whose members were free to adopt, alter or entirely ignore any or all of them, except insofar as the governor, by virtue of his prestige and his influence with the members of the legislature, might affect the course of his recommendations through the legislature. The governor retained his power under Article II, Section 17 to veto any appropriation bill of which he disapproved; however, political realities required that he exercise this power sparingly.

In earlier times when the range and scope of State activities were limited, this procedure was not seriously objectionable for it was not impossible for members of the legislature to have a fairly clear grasp of the State's financial operations. The eventual growth in the size and complexity of governmental programs and machinery resulted, however, in embarrassing deficits. In addition, it was not unusual for excessive appropriations to result from the political pressure of lobbyists and from "logrolling" tactics among members of the General Assembly who sought to ensure passage of some measure in which they had an interest. Other important needs of the State were consequently overlooked or given inadequate consideration.

A particularly disturbing experience occurred in 1915 when there resulted a deficit of $2,000,000 in the state treasury. Shortly thereafter, the governor appointed a commission headed by Dr. Frank J. Goodnow to study possible solutions to the problem. This commission proposed the institution of a carefully devised executive budget system, and the General Assembly and the people passed the necessary constitutional amendment. The amendment required the careful and centralized examination of requests for funds before they were submitted to the General Assembly for appropriations and for checking the total of proposed expenditures against revenue estimates. Partly because this task could not be performed during the brief period when the legislature was in session and also because it needed to be done by officers familiar with the needs of the several administrative agencies, responsibility for operating the system was placed upon the governor.

The "Goodnow Commission" stated the purpose of the system to be

> "to impose upon the governor the sole responsibility . . . of presenting to the legislature a complete and comprehensive statement of the needs and resources of the State . . . ; to make it impossible for the legislature so to change the plans proposed by the governor as to produce a deficit; but . . . to permit the legislature to make provision for any purpose not included in the governor's plan on the condition that it provide for the revenue which the accomplishment of its purpose necessitates."[2]

Article III, Section 52 contains generally the following features. The governor shall submit to the General Assembly at the beginning of each year a complete plan of proposed expenditures and estimated revenues for the following year, together with a thorough report of the current financial condition of the State and a bill providing for all proposed appropriations. The General Assembly may not increase any of the appropriations set forth in the bill, but it may strike out or reduce items therein. The bill as finally passed by the General Assembly becomes law immediately, and, therefore, is not subject to the governor's veto. After the budget bill has been finally acted upon by both houses of the General Assembly, additional appropriations may be

[2] MD. S. JOUR. 133 (January session, 1916).