cent under bicameralism to over 50 per
cent under unicameralism.33
Claim 6. unicameralism brings lobbyists
OUT INTO THE OPEN WHERE THEIR ACTIV-
ITIES ARE SUBJECT TO PUBLIC SCRUTINY.
The claim here is that the direct and
open procedures of the unicameral legis-
lature, and the searching publicity that
unicameralism permits, soon expose any
member who is prone to succumb to
lobbying influence.34 It is not uncom-
mon for a Nebraska legislator to de-
nounce a lobbyist by name on the floor
of the house and to make a statement
about what the lobbyist has been
doing.35
The attainment of a common policy
between the two chambers of a bicam-
eral system is measurably assisted — far
more than is commonly realized — by the
pressures of lobbyists.36 Unicameralism
avoids this, and also renders needless
the activity of lobbyists who, in opposing
legislation, secretly maneuver to get the
two houses of a bicameral legislature to
adopt different versions of the same bill
in order to kill it or to give them a
chance secretly to influence the confer-
ence action and the writing of the
conference report.
Although unicameralism reduces the
number of opportunities for lobbying
influence, and makes attempted influ-
ence more likely to receive public scru-
tiny, some observers are not convinced
that unicameralism reduces the influ-
ence of lobbyists.
Claim 7. unicameralism pinpoints respon-
sibility FOR LEGISLATIVE ACTIONS.
Under unicameralism responsibility is
33 Id. at 509.
34 Senning, supra note 24, at 64, 65.
35 Ibid.
36 Hagan, The Bicameral Principle in State
Legislatures, 11 J. pub. L. 321 (I962)-
114
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clearly focused.37 There is no oppor-
tunity to pass bills for the other house
to kill, to alter or kill legislation in the
secrecy of the conference committee, or
to claim that there is no use to consider
certain legislation on the grounds that
it would meet sure death in the other
chamber. The complexities of bicam-
eral procedures make it difficult for the
public to keep track of the progress of
legislation.
Claim 8. unicameral legislatures are
MORE ECONOMICAL.
The Vermont unicameral legislature
was less expensive that the bicameral
legislature both in total and per capita
expenditures.38 In Nebraska, the switch
to unicameralism reduced the legislative
expenses by almost 25 per cent. A leg-
islative council was introduced at the
time of the switch to unicameralism.
If the expenses of the council are ex-
cluded from the costs of operating
the unicameral legislature, savings
amounted to over 27 per cent.39 The
reasons for this are obvious. A unicam-
eral legislature can be expected to have
fewer salaried members, a smaller legis-
lative staff, reduced travel allowances,
smaller printing expenditures, and less
operating expense.
Other Claims. unicameralism results in
IMPROVED PUBLIC UNDERSTANDING OF LEG-
ISLATIVE ACTIVITIES, THE DEVELOPMENT OF
LEGISLATIVE LEADERSHIP IS FACILITATED,
AND A CLOSER RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE
LEGISLATURE AND THE GOVERNOR IS PER-
MITTED.
The first of these claims is implicit in
many of those discussed above. The
simplicity and openness of the unicam-
37 national municipal league, supra
note 11.
38SHULL, supra note 3, at 12.
39 Alysworth, Nebraska's Unicameral Legis-
lature Saves Money for Taxpayers, 27 nat'l
mun. rev. 492 (1938).
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