

cent under bicameralism to over 50 per cent under unicameralism.³³

Claim 6. UNICAMERALISM BRINGS LOBBYISTS OUT INTO THE OPEN WHERE THEIR ACTIVITIES ARE SUBJECT TO PUBLIC SCRUTINY.

The claim here is that the direct and open procedures of the unicameral legislature, and the searching publicity that unicameralism permits, soon expose any member who is prone to succumb to lobbying influence.³⁴ It is not uncommon for a Nebraska legislator to denounce a lobbyist by name on the floor of the house and to make a statement about what the lobbyist has been doing.³⁵

The attainment of a common policy between the two chambers of a bicameral system is measurably assisted—far more than is commonly realized—by the pressures of lobbyists.³⁶ Unicameralism avoids this, and also renders needless the activity of lobbyists who, in opposing legislation, secretly maneuver to get the two houses of a bicameral legislature to adopt different versions of the same bill in order to kill it or to give them a chance secretly to influence the conference action and the writing of the conference report.

Although unicameralism reduces the number of opportunities for lobbying influence, and makes attempted influence more likely to receive public scrutiny, some observers are not convinced that unicameralism reduces the influence of lobbyists.

Claim 7. UNICAMERALISM PINPOINTS RESPONSIBILITY FOR LEGISLATIVE ACTIONS.

Under unicameralism responsibility is

³³ *Id.* at 509.

³⁴ Senning, *supra* note 24, at 64, 65.

³⁵ *Ibid.*

³⁶ Hagan, *The Bicameral Principle in State Legislatures*, 11 J. PUB. L. 321 (1962).

clearly focused.³⁷ There is no opportunity to pass bills for the other house to kill, to alter or kill legislation in the secrecy of the conference committee, or to claim that there is no use to consider certain legislation on the grounds that it would meet sure death in the other chamber. The complexities of bicameral procedures make it difficult for the public to keep track of the progress of legislation.

Claim 8. UNICAMERAL LEGISLATURES ARE MORE ECONOMICAL.

The Vermont unicameral legislature was less expensive than the bicameral legislature both in total and per capita expenditures.³⁸ In Nebraska, the switch to unicameralism reduced the legislative expenses by almost 25 per cent. A legislative council was introduced at the time of the switch to unicameralism. If the expenses of the council are excluded from the costs of operating the unicameral legislature, savings amounted to over 27 per cent.³⁹ The reasons for this are obvious. A unicameral legislature can be expected to have fewer salaried members, a smaller legislative staff, reduced travel allowances, smaller printing expenditures, and less operating expense.

Other Claims. UNICAMERALISM RESULTS IN IMPROVED PUBLIC UNDERSTANDING OF LEGISLATIVE ACTIVITIES, THE DEVELOPMENT OF LEGISLATIVE LEADERSHIP IS FACILITATED, AND A CLOSER RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE LEGISLATURE AND THE GOVERNOR IS PERMITTED.

The first of these claims is implicit in many of those discussed above. The simplicity and openness of the unicam-

³⁷ NATIONAL MUNICIPAL LEAGUE, *supra* note 11.

³⁸ SHULL, *supra* note 3, at 12.

³⁹ Alysforth, *Nebraska's Unicameral Legislature Saves Money for Taxpayers*, 27 NAT'L MUN. REV. 492 (1938).