The clerk of the house of delegates delivers to the clerk of the senate a bill, entitled, An act permitting
the proprietors of lots binding on the water at the west end of the bason in Baltimore-town
to extend and improve the same, thus endorsed; " By the house of delegates, December 21, 1796:
" Read the first and second time by especial order and will pass.
                                         " By order,                                  W.  HARWOOD, clk."
    The honourable Charles Carroll, of Carrollton, Esquire, from the joint committee of both houses
appointed to consider on the amendments proposed by the commonwealth of Virginia to the constitution
of the United States, brings in and delivers to the president the following report:
    THE joint committee of both houses, to whom were referred the amendments proposed to be
made to the government of the United States by the legislature in Virginia in December last, have
had them under consideration for some time, and cannot recommend the adoption for the following
reasons.
    Should the first amendment be ratified by the legislatures of nine states, no treaty of the least
consequence could be made as now authorised, without the sanction of a majority of the house of
representatives; thus would that house be let into a participation of a part of the executive power,
which has been exclusively vested in the president and senate, as fitter for the transacting such business,
and concluding treaties; for the senate being a smaller and more select body, it is presumable will be
less liable to the influence of a party, and therefore treaties will probably be investigated in that house
with greater accuracy, and with more temper and judgment, than in the other; nor was this the
only reason for giving the senate a share of the treaty-making power; all the states being equally
represented in the senate, it was considered that this equality of suffrage, coupled with the control
over treaties, would reconcile the smaller states to the preponderancy which the larger possess in the
other branch.  But the president and senate may be corrupted, and sacrifice their country to a foreign
interest.  Are the president and senate more likely to be corrupted than the representatives?  Few,
compared to these, a greater responsibility attaches to their characters and conduct; guilt, divided
among many, seems to lessen, and becomes almost imperceptible in each individual, sheltering and
countenancing himself under the authority of numbers.  Large popular assemblies, in their public
proceedings, have been unfeelingly guilty of crimes, from the commission of which each individual,
standing alone, or supported by few; would have shrunk with horror.  We may reasonably conclude,
that the state legislatures will, in general, elect into the senate men of good sense, information and
integrity; if they do not, they will either want discernment or honesty, of be actuated by party.
Admitting that in particular districts, nay, that in whole states, a party spirit may at times prevail,
the delusion, it is to be hoped, will not continue long, and if it should, its spread through the greater
portion of the union is quite improbable.  If the state legislatures want discernment or honesty, can
their constituents be discerning and honest?  Corrupt, indeed, must that people be, and degraded
in the extreme, who have not sense enough to discover, or virtue to pursue, their real interests.  In
an emergency of this kind, what will partial amendments avail?  A revolution only, calamity and long
sufferings, can operate their reform, and restore such a people to a just way of thinking and acting.
    Does experience call for any of the proposed amendments?  To amend a constitution in its infancy,
from the dread of imaginary, and not from the existence of real evils, is surely most unwise.
So far as the short trial we have had of the federal government will enable us to judge of its future
operations, we ought to remain satisfied with its present form; for a large majority of the American
people, and this state in particular, have repeatedly expressed their approbation of its administration,
and their thankfulness for the benefits derived from that government.  No country can be said to
enjoy a free constitution, nor will long retain its essence and purity, without proper checks and balances.
The framers of the federal government have so distributed powers among the parts composing
it, that each may control the others; no event has yet discovered  that the distribution has
been injudiciously made; why then has it been thought necessary to alter it?  Why take away from
two branches, to impart in common to one, that portion of power which was exclusively lodged in
the two?  Perhaps it may be said, that the power has been abused--When parties run high, and are
nearly poised, every expedient will be tried to give the mastery to the one or to the other.  Does
the constitution present barriers to this wished for ascendancy?  These must be levelled; amendments
must do them away, and will be proposed by the defeated party on the spur of the occasion; in the
very hurry and tumult of the passions, disappointed and soiled in a favourite object, at such a time
can amendments be discussed and weighed with that coolness and candour so requisite to the forming
a right judgment?
    Why should a tribunal, other than the senate, be instituted for the trial of impeachments?  No
person has been impeached before the senate, and therefore no defect in the tribunal can be collected
from facts and experiment; the objections, if not altogether proceedings from a love of novelty and
change, must have originated from fancied apprehensions of unfairness and corruption in the senate,
as a court.  If the government is to be new modelled upon the visionary conceits of speculative
men, for ever on the change, it never will assume a stable form, and the condition of the people
living under it will be as miserable as those under vague and uncertain laws, which, partaking of
the nature of the government, if this be fluctuating and capricious, those will be equally so.
    The third amendment contemplates and provides for a more frequent election and renewal of
members in the senate of the United States.  In this respect it appears to the committee to run directly
counter to the main end of its institution.  The framers of the federal government, no doubt,
wished to temper and control those fallies of passion which it was foreseen party heats would at times
produce in the house of representatives.  No method so effectual for the purpose occurred, as to give
to the senators that permanency that might secure them from the frenzy of the moment, from the