|
administered in the backend of a barber-
shop in courts of limited jurisdiction. An-
other witness I believe testified that a very
competent judge who was also a carpenter
or cabinet maker, the only thing necessary
to transform his shop into a court room was
to sweep up the shavings, and then court
was in session.
Some of the testimony of that nature I
think prompted the continued use in our
Committee of "chaotic," which I have used
here to be factual.
THE CHAIRMAN: Delegate Rybczyn-
ski.
DELEGATE RYBCZYNSKI: The word
"chaotic" would apply to the facilities,
rather than to the actual administration,
I think it is fair to say.
DELEGATE MUDD: Yes.
DELEGATE RYBCZYNSKI: You al-
luded to, or you just touched on the Mont-
gomery County situation as to the orphan's
court. Would you tell this Committee the
information that you learned on this trans-
formation; that is, from the orphan's court
of Montgomery County to the supervision
and administration of these matters by the
circuit court of Montgomery County? Did
that work well, or did it not work well?
DELEGATE MUDD: I would say pre-
liminarily that if the testimony before our
Committee could be counted in pages, prob-
ably somewhere between a third and a half
of the pages would deal with Montgomery
County. But the conclusion of our Commit-
tee was that the problem in Montgomery
County, if there was one, regarding or-
phan's court jurisdiction being taken over
by the superior court, was not in the sys-
tem, but in the administration.
THE CHAIRMAN: Delegate Rybczyn-
ski.
DELEGATE RYBCZYNSKI: I have a
very pointed question.
If we accept the fact that functional
division would be a good thing for the dis-
trict court, why is functional division also
not applicable to the superior court?
DELEGATE MUDD: It is so provided
for in section 5.08.
DELEGATE RYBCZYNSKI: Sorry;
right.
THE CHAIRMAN: Delegate Clagett.
DELEGATE MUDD: I am glad I got
one easy question.
|
DELEGATE CLAGETT: Delegate
Mudd, with respect to section 5.11, I note
that the principal difference between the
majority and minority is that the commis-
sioners would be appointed by the court,
rather than provided by law.
DELEGATE MUDD: Yes.
DELEGATE CLAGETT: The objection
of the minority seemed to have some merit
in that it would relieve the district judge
of the responsibility of interviewing, se-
lecting and granting special appointments
to the successful applicant as a commis-
sioner.
DELEGATE MUDD: The first observa-
tion you made was persuasive. Our Commit-
tee was anxious to relieve the district judge
of any appointive responsibility. But on
the other hand as I recollect the testimony
and discussion in Committee it was our
considered opinion after careful delibera-
tion that the work of these commissioners
was the function of the judiciary. To a
great extent the responsibility for admin-
istration of the court system carried
through to these commissioners, and it was
just impractical in the final analysis for
a district court judge to have to try to
properly administer justice in his district
if he had no control over the commis-
sioners.
By experience there was a wealth of
testimony before our Committee that some
Ipresent committing magistrates are not
capable of performing the functions re-
quired of commissioners.
THE CHAIRMAN: Delegate Clagett, do
you have a further question?
DELEGATE CLAGETT: I would pre-
sume, if I am not correct, will you please
correct me, that the committing magis-
trates and justices of the peace, as pres-
ently designated, would automatically shift
over and become commissioners or at least
to a large extent or percentage. Is that
not true?
DELEGATE MUDD: Under our pro-
posal they would continue under the trans-
fer provisions until this four-tier proposal
becomes operable. But the appointment
would be up to the district judge. I would
guess in many instances as I assume would
happen to clerks of courts and registers of
wills, those who are capable and competent
would be appointed.
THE CHAIRMAN: Delegate Clagett.
DELEGATE CLAGETT: My last ques-
tion also is with respect to section 5.11 and
|