and makes coherent the judicial system of
the State, it should also strengthen and
unify the legislature.
A unified executive should be counter-
balanced with a unified legislature. If we
are to strengthen state government so that
the federal system is to be preserved, it is
essential that the legislature which is the
weakest branch of state government today
be made equally strong with the other
branches.
Secondly, we believe that unicameralism
will enhance the prestige of our legislature,
and the influence and significance of each
member of the legislature.
Public opinion polls consistently show
the image of state legislatures to be a poor
one. We believe that membership in a single
chamber will carry greater prestige for the
individual member by creating a situation
in which no member's influence or power
is diluted, that on the average it will there-
fore attract more responsible citizens to
run and seek legislative service.
Thirdly, we believe that a one-house
legislature will clearly focus responsibility,
making legislators more responsive and ac-
countable to the people. This is because
each member will recognize that there is no
other body to check his actions. Legislatures
are strengthened primarily by encouraging
responsible behavior on the part of every
member, and the great advantage of uni-
cameralism is that it clearly focuses pub-
lic attention on one house and makes it far
easier to trace the course of legislation,
the activities of each member and the ac-
tivities of representatives of any special
interest groups.
We in the minority found it most in-
structive that every lobbyist who appeared
before our Committee was a strong, en-
passioned advocate of the bicameral system.
We were forced to the conclusion that there
must be something better in a bicameral, a
diffused, and a repetitive legislative process
to the benefit of the special interest groups.
Fourthly, we believe that a unicameral
legislature will provide more careful con-
sideration of legislation. The experience of
Nebraska, the experience with local gov-
ernments throughout the country, the ex-
perience of unicameral legislatures else-
where in the world, I think, indicate that
the death rate of unwise legislation is as
high in a unicameral body as it is in a bi-
cameral body. In fact, if we look at our
own legislative process in Maryland, it is
not the existence of two houses that ac-
counts for the death of most legislation |
that dies, but rather the screening given
it in the first house. In 1967, 80 percent
of all legislation introduced in Maryland
which ultimately was defeated died in the
house of its origin and not in the other
house.
A unicameral legislature dispenses with
the need for hasty and ill-considered legis-
lation. We of the minority believe that bi-
cameralism provides a self-fulfilling proph-
ecy that there will be hasty and ill-consid-
ered legislation because of the need to rush
on, to get legislation to the other house, in
order that it might be considered at all.
By the establishment of careful proce-
dures, a measure can be adequately con-
sidered and debated in a single house, and
a unicameral body will not find itself
jammed with bills it has not seen before
as it is moving toward adjournment.
Certainly a great deal more can be
achieved for the same cost in a unicameral
body that in a bicameral body, whether we
be concerned with salaries of legislators or
the necessities of staff and office facilities.
We believe that when the arguments for
bicameralism are reduced to their essen-
tials, they consist of two principal proposi-
tions. Both have been stated admirably and
well by the Chairman: first, that bicam-
eralism is traditional—but so are elected
judges, long Constitutions, division of ex-
ecutive authority and weak local govern-
ment. In other words, the reasons for bi-
cameralism are historical rather than log-
ical. We can, of course, resort to the cup
and saucer theory. I think the minority re-
sponse to that theory would be, if I may
use the current vernacular, don't "cool it,
baby."
The second basic argument is that bi-
cameralism is supposed to provide checks
and balances. The minority suggests that
this certainly cannot be denied. If two
committees consider the same matter, if
two people consider the same matter, or if
two legislative houses consider the same
matter, the law of averages would indicate
that there would be some differences be-
tween them.
But why, we ask, should the legisla-
ture be the only branch of government
which is required by the constitution to
check and balance itself? We believe that
checks and balances in modern government
should exist between the branches of gov-
ernment, and not within any one of the
branches; that by providing an internal
check and balance, bicameralism perma-
nently relegates the legislative branch to |
