

and makes coherent the judicial system of the State, it should also strengthen and unify the legislature.

A unified executive should be counter-balanced with a unified legislature. If we are to strengthen state government so that the federal system is to be preserved, it is essential that the legislature which is the weakest branch of state government today be made equally strong with the other branches.

Secondly, we believe that unicameralism will enhance the prestige of our legislature, and the influence and significance of each member of the legislature.

Public opinion polls consistently show the image of state legislatures to be a poor one. We believe that membership in a single chamber will carry greater prestige for the individual member by creating a situation in which no member's influence or power is diluted, that on the average it will therefore attract more responsible citizens to run and seek legislative service.

Thirdly, we believe that a one-house legislature will clearly focus responsibility, making legislators more responsive and accountable to the people. This is because each member will recognize that there is no other body to check his actions. Legislatures are strengthened primarily by encouraging responsible behavior on the part of every member, and the great advantage of unicameralism is that it clearly focuses public attention on one house and makes it far easier to trace the course of legislation, the activities of each member and the activities of representatives of any special interest groups.

We in the minority found it most instructive that every lobbyist who appeared before our Committee was a strong, impassioned advocate of the bicameral system. We were forced to the conclusion that there must be something better in a bicameral, a diffused, and a repetitive legislative process to the benefit of the special interest groups.

Fourthly, we believe that a unicameral legislature will provide more careful consideration of legislation. The experience of Nebraska, the experience with local governments throughout the country, the experience of unicameral legislatures elsewhere in the world, I think, indicate that the death rate of unwise legislation is as high in a unicameral body as it is in a bicameral body. In fact, if we look at our own legislative process in Maryland, it is not the existence of two houses that accounts for the death of most legislation

that dies, but rather the screening given it in the first house. In 1967, 80 percent of all legislation introduced in Maryland which ultimately was defeated died in the house of its origin and not in the other house.

A unicameral legislature dispenses with the need for hasty and ill-considered legislation. We of the minority believe that bicameralism provides a self-fulfilling prophecy that there will be hasty and ill-considered legislation because of the need to rush on, to get legislation to the other house, in order that it might be considered at all.

By the establishment of careful procedures, a measure can be adequately considered and debated in a single house, and a unicameral body will not find itself jammed with bills it has not seen before as it is moving toward adjournment.

Certainly a great deal more can be achieved for the same cost in a unicameral body than in a bicameral body, whether we be concerned with salaries of legislators or the necessities of staff and office facilities. We believe that when the arguments for bicameralism are reduced to their essentials, they consist of two principal propositions. Both have been stated admirably and well by the Chairman: first, that bicameralism is traditional—but so are elected judges, long Constitutions, division of executive authority and weak local government. In other words, the reasons for bicameralism are historical rather than logical. We can, of course, resort to the cup and saucer theory. I think the minority response to that theory would be, if I may use the current vernacular, don't "cool it, baby."

The second basic argument is that bicameralism is supposed to provide checks and balances. The minority suggests that this certainly cannot be denied. If two committees consider the same matter, if two people consider the same matter, or if two legislative houses consider the same matter, the law of averages would indicate that there would be some differences between them.

But why, we ask, should the legislature be the only branch of government which is required by the constitution to check and balance itself? We believe that checks and balances in modern government should exist between the branches of government, and not within any one of the branches; that by providing an internal check and balance, bicameralism permanently relegates the legislative branch to