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THE PRESIDENT: Delegate Boyer,
Delegate Case has a question with respect
to section 9.10.
DELEGATE CASE: Delegate Boyer,
this sentence says, and I read it so that you
and the members of the Convention can
have its full context, "A person tried upon
impeachment whether or not convicted
shall be liable to criminal prosecution and
punishment," look at now for deletion,
"shall be liable to criminal prosecution
and punishment whether or not convicted."
I am not sure what it does mean, but
conceivably it could mean that a man who
was tried upon impeachment, found not
guilty, nevertheless would be liable to pun-
ishment. What bothers me is the word
"shall" in here, and it indicates that per-
haps the state's attorney would be re-
quired, even though the case was the flim-
siest of cases, to file some kind of criminal
information against this person, bring him
into court, and punishment might follow.
I cannot believe this is what you meant,
but it could really be read that way.
THE PRESIDENT: Delegate Boyer.
DELEGATE BOYER: You are abso-
lutely right, sir, and to relieve any question
about the case of this matter, the intent is
that the person tried upon impeachment,
whether or not convicted, will still be liable
for criminal prosecution and will not be
given any immunity because of the fact he
had not been convicted of impeachment,
immunity that is, from any criminal
prosecution.
THE PRESIDENT: Is it intended that
the phrase "shall be liable" would mean
may nevertheless be subject to criminal
prosecution and punishment? Is that the
intent, Delegate Boyer?
DELEGATE BOYER: Yes, that is. The
intent is not to grant any immunity for
criminal prosecution in the future for any-
body who may have been not convicted of
impeachment proceedings.
THE PRESIDENT: Not suggesting that
precise language as desirable language to
use, but would that meet the point you
raised, something like that?
Delegate Case.
DELEGATE CASE: Yes, sir, if you
would strike out the words "shall be liable"
and say "may nevertheless be subject to
criminal prosecution and punishment," then
I think you would certainly have it.
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THE PRESIDENT: Delegate Penniman,
would you have any comment as to that
suggestion?
DELEGATE PENNIMAN: I have no
objection to it.
THE PRESIDENT: Delegate Mason.
DELEGATE MASON: I would like to
ask Chairman Boyer a question.
THE PRESIDENT: As to this same
matter?
DELEGATE MASON: Yes, sir.
THE PRESIDENT: Very well.
DELEGATE MASON: Chairman Boyer,
are you suggesting that you would not be
criminally liable if you were not convicted
of impeachment? Is it necessary to put the
sentence in there?
THE PRESIDENT: I think that is ex-
actly the reverse of what he said, Delegate
Mason.
DELEGATE MASON: My question is,
is the sentence necessary?
THE PRESIDENT: Delegate Boyer.
DELEGATE BOYER: Delegate Mason,
we think it is. A person conceivably could
be tried for impeachment and under the
procedure here enumerated, found not
guilty of impeachment, reinstated in his
former position of trust and profit. How-
ever, that should not negate and circum-
vent the criminal law of the State, and
still would make him liable for criminal
prosecution under article 27 or whatever
may happen there.
I would go with Chairman Penniman to
infer that the word "may" would probably
clear up the situation, but I do think this
sentence is needed in the constitution.
THE PRESIDENT: As the Chair re-
calls the earlier discussion, partly before
the Committee, on this, Delegate Mason, the
sentence was thought desirable to prevent
any contention akin to a claim of double
jeopardy, for instance, so that one im-
peached who had been tried upon impeach-
ment and either convicted or not convicted
could not be tried for the crime which may
have been the basis of the impeachment.
Delegate Henderson.
DELEGATE HENDERSON: Just along
that same line I want to call attention to
the fact the very anomolous feature in the
Maryland law. It is tried by a panel of
judges, and it could be considered a kind
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