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THE CHAIRMAN: State the privilege.
DELEGATE H. TAYLOR: In the bal-
cony to the right of the Chair sits a former
law associate of mine who is now an attor-
ney in the Trust Department of Riggs
Bank. Her name is not Baby Jane. It is
Miss Linda Watkins, and I hope the Con-
vention will give her its usual warm
welcome.
(AppZanse.)
THE CHAIRMAN: The question now
arises on the adoption of Amendment 13-B
as a substitute for Amendment 13.
Are you ready for the question?
Delegate James.
DELEGATE JAMES: Mr. Chairman, I
would like a point of clarification here.
Now, this language as I understand it pro-
vides for the right of removal of civil cases
in trial courts and the use of the word
"shall".
Now, as I interpret this, it means that
it is a constitutional command to either the
General Assembly or the Court of Appeals
to provide a right of removal in all cases.
Now, if there is a limitation to this in-
terpretation, I think this should be clear.
This says removal of civil cases.
Now, as I interpret that, that does not
mean the right to pick and choose those
civil cases, but it means the right to re-
move all cases. The Court of Appeals power
is merely limited to the details of how
this shall be exercised in all cases.
THE CHAIRMAN: I take it that that
is what the language means.
Delegate Moser, do you differ from that?
DELEGATE MOSER: I did not follow
the entire colloquy.
THE CHAIRMAN: Delegate James is
suggesting or inquiring whether the effect
of this provision is to require either the
Court of Appeals or the General Assembly
to provide for removal in all civil cases.
This would include not merely those where
there is a right of removal now, but in all
civil cases, cases in equity for instance.
DELEGATE MOSER: I answered his
previous inquiry. All civil cases, no, but all
types of action, yes, if that is what he
means. It is intended to include equity cases
and all other types of action.
THE CHAIRMAN: His question is or
his suggestion is that the language does not
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permit either the General Assembly or the
Court of Appeals in acting under this sec-
tion to say that there shall not be a right
of removal in any particular kind of civil
case.
Do you concur?
DELEGATE MOSER: I am sorry, no, I
do not mean that.
THE CHAIRMAN: The Chair suggests,
then, that there should be some clarifying
language because the language would ap-
pear to indicate that.
Delegate Moser.
DELEGATE MOSER: Then I would
suggest that we have a luncheon recess and
I will get together with Delegates James
and Henderson on this if the Chair would
want this because this is something which
should then be carefully drafted.
THE CHAIRMAN: I had hoped to dis-
pose of the matter before lunch, but I think
it is more important that we get the lan-
guage correct. I would hope that if we re-
cess for lunch now that when we come
back that we do not renew the entire debate
that has taken place in the last hour or
hour and a half.
For what purpose does Delegate Hender-
son rise?
DELEGATE HENDERSON: I want to
state my interpretation of this language
which may be contrary to what the Chair
expressed if I am in order in doing so. It
seems to me this would give to the Court or
the legislature the right, for example, to
continue the present practice of not allow-
ing the removal in condemnation cases, for
example, where it is necessary for the jury
to have a view of the property. That is a
whole class of cases which has never been
subject to removal and it never has been.
I do not think the adoption of that
amendment would change that rule or law.
I take it that the rules could include con-
ditions. It might say that it required good
cause shown or the possibility of prejudice
before it might allow removal and all such
things as that.
It was my intention in voting for this,
and my thought, that the General Assembly
or the Court of Appeals would have full
power to make classifications. While the
right was mandated, it was not any par-
ticular right, but a right subject to such
condition as to time or otherwisse that
might be imposed by rule.
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