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carried out, then you vote in favor of this
amendment.
THE CHAIRMAN : Does any other dele-
gate desire to speak in opposition to the
amendment?
Delegate Willoner.
DELEGATE WILLONER: Mr. Chair-
man, I wish to speak in opposition to this
amendment. I wish to point out several
things that differ in this amendment from
the present state of the law.
First, the Weeks case provides for ex-
clusion of evidence seized in violation of
this article in criminal cases, only. But a
State can obtan a warrant; a citizen
could not. So a citizen could never gather
information with a warrant under this
provision. Therefore, we would not only
be excluding evidence, but ending the pos-
sibility of ever getting evidence.
Secondly, we now have a prohibition
against wiretapping and eavesdropping
evidence being admissible in evidence. This
is provided by statute. So not only is it
illegal to obtain wiretap and eavesdrop evi-
dence, but it is also inadmissible evidence
in court. So that is already prohibited.
There is what I would call a purist rea-
son for objecting to this particular amend-
ment, and that is that this changes the
concept of the Bill of Rights as it is pro-
posed. The Bill of Rights is a series of
"Thou shalt nots." This is not a "Thou
shalt not." It is not that the State shall
not do something but that an individual or
private persons shall not.
For this reason, I want to urge that you
vote against this amendment.
THE CHAIRMAN: Does anyone desire
to speak in favor?
DELEGATE BOTHE: Mr. Chairman, I
would like to speak very briefly. I was
going to sit down and say I would vote
against sex if you vote against this amend-
ment. But, Delegate Willoner, as far as
the wiretap evidence concei%ned being ex-
cludable, it is only wiretap and not eaves-
dropping devices which are excluded by
statutes under Maryland law today.
Secondly, as for the constitution pro-
viding only for limitations on the action of
the State, this amendment does not call for
any limitation on private action. It merely
says that the Courts shall not countenance
abuse of the 4th Amendment or section 4
of our new constitution, which is certainly
an element of state action; and for these
reasons, I would suggest that both of the
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points which Delegate Willoner has raised
and ones which I respect, if accurate, are
not applicable to this amendment which is
proposed here.
THE CHAIRMAN: Delegate Bothe, in
view of the statements by Delegate Wil-
loner and your reply, the Chair would like
to ask a question or two for the informa-
tion of the Committee on Style.
Your amendment in lines 3 and 4 says
"evidence secured in violation of these pro-
visions." Can you indicate what is referred
to by the words "these provisions"? In
other words, does it refer to the whole of
section 4, or does it refer only to lines 43
to the end?
DELEGATE BOTHE: Mr. Chairman, it
would refer to the whole of section 4. How-
ever, as has been pointed out by me and by
Delegate Willoner, the possibility of a pri-
vate citizen being able to obtain a warrant
is virtually nonexistent.
THE CHAIRMAN : That is why I asked
the question. The first part of section 4,
as I read it, has nothing whatsoever to do
with warrants. If your answer is that evi-
dence secured in violation of these pro-
visions means, for instance, an invasion of
privacy as stated in 41. or interception of
communications as stated in 39 and 40,
I take it is would have nothing to do with
a search warrant. Is that correct?
DELEGATE BOTHE: As applied to a
case where there is no warrant and where
there is an unreasonable search or seizure,
there would be no admissibility.
THE CHAIRMAN: Well, to be specific,
I do not understand the application of your
amendment, in view of what you just said,
in a private matter, a civil proceeding.
Suppose one takes moving pictures of a
person claiming to be injured as a result
of an automobile accident. If it was deemed
that those moving pictures were an un-
reasonable invasion of privacy of a person,
would it mean that they would not be ad-
missible in evidence?
DELEGATE BOTHE: That is correct.
THE CHAIRMAN: And the same thing would be 'true if an eye witness, not a
moving picture camera, observed conduct
which might be evidence in a divorce case ?
If it were deemed an unreasonable in-
vasion of privacy it would not be admis-
sible?
DELEGATE BOTHE: With the proviso
that the court would have latitude to de-
termine what unreasonable meant, as they
do in all constitutional language.
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