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maybe he will be back shortly.
The Chair recognizes Delegate Dulany.
DELEGATE DULANY: The Committee
on Public Information would like to report
that the score is 10-7, at the half time,
Green Bay.
DELEGATE J. CLARK (presiding) :
Delegate Kiefer.
DELEGATE KIEFER: In case you did
not note it last night, in section 2, I cor-
rected a typographical error. The word on
the second line, after the word "religion"
should be "or", not "nor".
DELEGATE J. CLARK (presiding) :
If there is no objection, this correction
can be made.
Are there any further questions on sec-
tion 2?
(There was no response.)
If not, we will move to section 3. Are
there any questions on section 3?
(There was no response.)
Are there any questions on section 4?
(There was no response.)
Are there any questions on section 5?
Delegate Hargrove.
DELEGATE HARGROVE: Chairman
Kiefer, in section 5, on line 3, does the
word "shall" modify each of the various
portions as you go down the section?
In other words, a person accused of a
crime shall have a right, and so forth, for
example, to be informed, to be confronted,
to have compulsory process, and so forth?
DELEGATE J. CLARK (presiding) :
Delegate Kiefer.
DELEGATE KIEFER: That is my opin-
ion, yes, it does.
DELEGATE J. CLARK (presiding) :
Delegate Hargrove.
DELEGATE HARGROVE: A second
question. Did the Committee intend that
this be an absolute right to have these vari-
ous things such as to be confronted, jury
trial, and so forth?
DELEGATE J. CLARK (presiding) :
Delegate Kiefer.
DELEGATE KIEFER: What do you
mean "an absolute right"?
This is the language of the Sixth Amend-
ment, and it is not unlike the language of
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our Article 21. When you say "absolute
right", I assume they are absolute rights
within reasonable limitations. The Supreme
Court of the United States, and our own
Court of Appeals, is constantly judging
specific situations and interpreting the ap-
plication of these acts.
DELEGATE J. CLARK (presiding) :
Delegate Hargrove.
DELEGATE HARGROVE: I understand
that, but what I am driving at, does the
language used here make it mandatory
that these rights be had by a person ac-
cused of a crime — absolutely, therefore,
not being able to waive any of these rights
such as you can under the present con-
struction of the federal and state Con-
stitutions.
DELEGATE J. CLARK (presiding) :
Delegate Kiefer.
DELEGATE KIEFER: I am going to
yield to Delegate Bothe on this. She is one
of our criminal law experts.
DELEGATE BOTHE: I think the an-
swer is simple. Insofar as the Supreme
Court and State Court of Appeals have to
date construed these rights to be absolute,
they are and they will become more or less
so as future cases determine.
DELEGATE J. CLARK (presiding) :
Delegate Hargrove.
DELEGATE HARGROVE: Under this
language, could a person waive the right
to counsel, if it is mandatory?
DELEGATE J. CLARK (presiding) :
Delegate Bothe.
DELEGATE BOTHE: I think I under-
stand your question. I cannot think of the
name of the case, but it has been held that
a person — in a very recent Maryland case
— can insist upon representing himself
and waive his right to counsel, a defective
delinquent case the name of which I can-
not recall. I do not think here we are mak-
ing any effort to change the scope of exist-
ing law or freeze the law in any respect.
We are simply reiterating the existing
language which is found in Article 21, with
the exception — as a matter of fact, I
think all of those provisions are in Article
21, and also in the Sixth Amendment.
DELEGATE J. CLARK (presiding) :
Delegate Hargrove.
DELEGATE HARGROVE: I think if
you will look, they do not use the word
"shall", they use the word "hath," if I am
not mistaken, and also the federal Consti-
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