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If you did not reach that point, I do not
want to press it.
DELEGATE J. CLARK (presiding) :
Delegate Kiefer.
DELEGATE KIEFER: We did not. I
am aware of the facts in the Everson case.
We adopted the statement of the court in
establishing what it intended to be a
separation of church and state, recognizing
the fact that in many cases throughout the
country, as well as the Supreme Court,
there are decisions holding something is
public use, something is for public pur-
poses, something in aid of religion. These
go in all directions.
DELEGATE J. CLARK (presiding) :
Delegate Gallagher.
DELEGATE GALLAGHER: Again, I
think that the Committee's attempt to pro-
vide for separation of church and state
was an admirable one. I think the First
Amendment has always been the avenue by
which separation of church and state has
been achieved, but the Everson case had
this paragraph right after the one you
quoted :
"On the other hand, other language of
the amendment comments that New Jersey
cannot hamper its citizens in the free ex-
ercise of their own religion. Consequently,
it cannot exclude individual Catholics, Lu-
therans, Mohammedans, Baptists, Jews,
Methodists, non-believers, Presbyterians, or
members of any faith, because of their
faith or lack of it, from receiving the
benefits of public welfare legislation."
This is the next paragraph after the
one you read. It is the complete rationale
of Everson, and not just the "no establish-
ment" aspect.
Would I be correct in assuming that this
entire rationale, what you have quoted and
what I have quoted, is the decision in Ever-
son which the Committee found acceptable?
DELEGATE J. CLARK (presiding) :
Delegate Kiefer.
DELEGATE KIEFER: Well, I think
that is correct, because it states what is
the law and what has to be followed in
the Court of Appeals in Maryland, and it
has nothing to do with the aid of religion,
but, as I pointed out, there are situations
which our court has held are matters in-
volving public purposes. It is a matter,
again, of the dog chasing the tail, where
you do not get into aiding or infringing on
the rights of people because of their
religion.
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DELEGATE J. CLARK (presiding) :
The Chair recognizes Delegate Weidemeyer.
DELEGATE WEIDEMEYER: In the
Horace Mann case, did not the Court of
Appeals cite the Everson case and refer to
the paragraph that you have in your memo-
randum so that, by reference, in that Hor-
ace Mann case they adopted the Everson
case construction of the First Amendment
language?
DELEGATE J. CLARK (presiding) :
Delegate Kiefer.
DELEGATE KIEFER: That is correct.
DELEGATE J. CLARK (presiding) :
The Chair recognizes Delegate Willoner.
DELEGATE WILLONER: The para-
graph that was just quoted by Delegate
Gallagher, however, was not discussed in
the Committee, was it?
DELEGATE J. CLARK (presiding) :
Delegate Kiefer.
DELEGATE KIEFER: I do not remem-
ber that it was.
DELEGATE J. CLARK (presiding) :
Are there further questions on section 2?
Delegate Clagett.
DELEGATE CLAGETT: Mr. Chairman,
I rise to a point of personal privilege to
remind the Delegates that upon occasion
they have heard me refer to whispers, and
have pointed in the direction of the portrait
at the corner of the wall. I have not made
it clear that our Journal Clerk, Mr. Oden
Bowie, is the direct grandson of Governor
Oden Bowie. I only refer to the fact so
that there is a certain amount of company
and companionship in some degree of bur-
den and hardship.
However, I rise at this point to ask that
you welcome here the granddaughter of
Governor Oden Bowie, and our Journal
Clerk's charming wife, Mrs. Laura Bowie,
and their daughter Maudie.
(Applause.)
DELEGATE J. CLARK (presiding) :
The Chair recognizes Delegate Pullen.
DELEGATE PULLEN: Mr. Chairman,
I would like to know if you do not think
that prolonged discussion on this topic this
evening would interfere with our religious
duties tomorrow.
DELEGATE J. CLARK (presiding) :
The Chair thinks that Delegate Powers
has disappeared at the present time, but
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