present ten-day limit is a critical need. I
suggest that twenty days would be more
practical. The Attorney General, I believe,
would share my view since it often requires
two weeks for his office to research and
prepare opinions attesting to a measure's
constitutionality.
The most vital sections of Article IV deal
with the gubernatorial powers of appoint-
ment and reorganization. Here, executive
authority can be most logically strengthened
to achieve more responsive and more effi-
cient administration.
Section 4.19 of the draft Constitution
provides the governor with essential reor-
ganization powers. Expanding and varying
state problems virtually demand this au-
thorization of executive initiative. While I
endorse the right of the General Assembly
to approve or disapprove any reorganiza-
tion plan presented by the governor, I am
concerned that the draft provision enables
the Legislature to modify any proposal.
Legislative ability to modify reorganiza-
tion plans obscures the clear lines of execu-
tive responsibility. Moreover, the General
Assembly may be unaware of the effect of
a modification on other executive functions.
Prohibition of the power to modify does
not deny the legislature the right to pro-
pose administrative reorganization or to
reject it. It simply prevents revisions
which might create a structure deviating in
part or entirety from the administration's
original objectives.
I fully accept and give credence to the
form and philosophy of section 4.20. If
gubernatorial policies are to be imple-
mented, it is essential to assure the coop-
eration of all principal department heads
through direct and unlimited line re-
sponsibility.
The provisions of section 4.2I refer to
the multi-headed administrative unit. A
series of policy-making boards and commis-
sions has evolved within the executive
branch to direct principal departments.
I seriously question whether these multi-
headed units are always in the best interest
of efficient administration, although I have
found incumbent boards cooperative.
However, a functional flaw becomes par-
ticularly apparent when the composition of
a multi-headed unit is based upon staggered
terms, allowing a majority to remain in
power well beyond the terms of elected
executive and legislative officials. This prac-
tice might encourage deliberate disregard
of administrative controls and compromise |
executive responsibility. Efficiency of a
multi-headed unit is also subject to serious
scrutiny inasmuch as all policy determina-
tion depends upon consensus and compro-
mise. This, in some cases, could lead to
pet project log-rolling among the board
members.
Article V generally sets forth measures
to create a unified, independent and pro-
fessional judicial system. It is imperative
that major reforms occur within the Mary-
land judiciary, especially in courts of
original jurisdiction. Constitutional safe-
guards must be devised not only to secure
full and equal justice for all, but to guar-
antee that judicial treatment be swift in
time, professional in performance and con-
sistent in quality.
Under the leadership of Judge Emory
Niles, a distinguished committee intensively
studied and subsequently recommended ma-
jor reforms for the Maryland judicial sys-
tem. The Niles Plan, in essence, is incor-
porated within the provisions of Article V.
While I have consistently endorsed the
Niles Plan in principle, I believe certain
practical impediments exist which will ac-
tually undermine its laudable purpose. I
would particularly draw your attention to
those sections dealing with the composition
of judicial nominating commissions. Section
5.15 grants the Appellate Courts Nominat-
ing Commission composed of six lay persons
and six lawyers, along with a judge, the
sole power to designate the lawyers who
may be appointed appellate judges. It be-
comes instantly apparent that one-half of
the State's twenty-four subdivisions cannot
possibly be represented on this Commis-
sion. If a member is chosen on the basis of
appellate circuits there can only be one
law and one lay member from each. This
almost courts manipulation and could pro-
mote log-rolling.
We must ask ourselves honestly whether.
we have not simply exchanged masters
rather than secured independence; whether
we have truly removed the courts from
politics or simply moved the politics from
the General Assembly to the bar associa-
tion; whether :fche judicial nominating sys-
tem as proposed in the draft constitution
does not militate against the appointment
of the independent lawyer, the rural lawyer,
the lawyer with a small, private practice.
I have great concern over the constitu-
tional propriety of section 5.17, which
grants the supreme court the right to de-
cree what class among lawyers of the State
will be eligible to serve and what class |
