special sessions on its own initiative. I en-
dorse this measure as a logical and reason-
able means to strengthen legislative
authority.
However, I seriously question the draft's
mandate to convene each regular session
of the General Assembly on the third
Wednesday of January. As governor-elect,
I was acutely aware that this time factor
severely inhibits review of the previous
Administration's budgetary recommenda-
tions and preparation of a legislative pro-
gram. For all practical purposes, the draft
revision — while an improvement over the
existing arrangement — curtails the exer-
cise of leadership and initiative by the
governor-elect.
Two modifications of the draft proposal
could correct this situation. The first would
be to authorize the inauguration of the in-
coming governor on the first Wednesday in
January; the second, to convene the regular
session of the General Assembly on the
first Wednesday in February. A combina-
tion of these features should facilitate
adequate preparation of a legislative pro-
gram, review of the budget, and encourage
proper leadership by the governor-elect.
Simultaneously, it would provide the newly
elected General Assembly with an extra day
to organize and elect its presiding officers.
Any discussion of Article IV must be
prefaced by a discussion of the philosophy
of the executive branch. The governor of
any state is elected by a plurality of the
voters. His authority stems from their man-
date and he is directly responsible to the
electorate. His election is presumed to imply
the endorsement of his programs and poli-
cies as articulated during his gubernatorial
campaign. While this mandate does not
sanction unrestricted or unqualified execu-
tive action, ample constitutional safeguards
against the abuse of executive authority
are vested in the legislative and judicial
branches. Checks and balances must exist
among the three traditional branches of
government to provide review of critical
decisions and to prevent disproportionate
exercise of authority. Yet this concept
should not, I believe, be enlarged to allow
checks and balances to exist within any
single branch of government.
For such an extension becomes a perver-
sion of purpose which obscures clear lines
of responsibility to the electorate and im-
pairs initiative and effectiveness by that
branch.
Under the existing Constitution's provi-
sions, executive-administrative authority is |
eroded by multiplicity of elected officials
and a multi-headed board lacking unequiv-
ocal line responsibility to the governor. If
the executive-administrative function is to
be performed as intended, these checks
within the executive branch must be elim-
inated — or defined and limited — so as not
to impede gubernatorial action. If a Gov-
ernor is to be fully and exclusively respon-
sible to the people, the administrators of
the executive branch must be fully and
exclusively responsible to him.
For this reason, I support the draft
Constitution's provisions confining elective
positions within the executive branch to a
Governor and a Lieutenant Governor elected
on the same ticket.
The post - audit review responsibility
should be transferred from the comptroller
of the treasury to the state treasurer, who
would supervise this function by a state
auditor under the legislative branch. The
state treasurer should continue to be elected
by the General Assembly. However, the
comptroller, divested of post-audit responsi-
bility, should become part of the executive
branch and an appointee of the governor.
In my opinion, the Board of Public Works
should be continued but reconstituted. The
Board provides a forum for public scrutiny
and presents an opportunity for the expres-
sion of legislative views on significant de-
cisions. I believe the state treasurer, an
adjunct of the legislative arm, should con-
tinue as the representative of the General
Assembly. However, I believe that the
state budget director would be a more use-
ful and effective board member than the
comptroller. The budget director, after all,
plays a more active and responsible role in
the implementation of board decisions. As
the governor's appointee, he admittedly
would tip the scales in the governor's
favor. This executive branch majority is an
essential and necessary measure to elimi-
nate any check within the executive branch.
While I favor an attorney general ap-
pointed by the governor, I recognize there
are sound arguments both ways. I feel ob-
ligated to point out that the incumbent
attorney general has cooperated fully with
my administration. Yet, it is obvious that
it could easily have been otherwise.
In government, time as well as structure,
is a critical factor. Section 4.16 of the
draft Constitution — regulating guberna-
torial consideration of bills enacted by the
General Assembly does not provide suffi-
cient time for adequate deliberation by the
executive. A significant extension of the |
