cannot be a provision which impairs the
obligation of contracts, and hence uncon-
stitutional as to one person and not so as to
another. What is the result? It will be
this. When gentlemen have consummated
this scheme, and want to carry it out, and i
is tested in the courts, it is my legal opinion
that no court in the country will decide it
to be constitutional. The Supreme Court
will decide that it is unconstitutional. In-
stead of abolishing slavery by this clause
slavery will still exist, because the article
will be declared unconstitutional.
Gentlemen refer to the abolition of slavery
ill the District of Columbia. This question
of the abolition of slavery without competi-
tion never was raised there. It never was
presented before. 'There never was such a
case in the history of the world, Im-
mediate emancipation in the District of
Columbia, to be carried out without com-
pensation, never was advocated. Slavery
in the District was abolished upon the basis
of compensation. Emancipation was not
so consummated in Massachusetts or anywhere
else. It always took effect grad-
ually. It was made to operate upon slave
property to be born after a certain future
time. It provided that all those born af-
ter a specified time should be free. I as-
sert, although gentlemen may look at the
proposition as a novel and startling one,
that no government has ever undertaken to
do what is proposed to be done by this
article; and hence when judgment comes
to be pronounced upon it by a court of
competent jurisdiction, that court will
affirm that courts never before had to pass
on such action by any government in any
part of the world
Gentlemen appear startled at the novelty
of my proposition, that this article violates
the Constitutional of the United States by
impairing the obligation of contracts and
divesting the rights of creditors. The
novelty of the proposition, Mr. President,
results from the novelty of your proposed
action. When a government abolishes
slavery and compensates the owners of the
slaves, the compensation stands in place of
the' slave property, and no contract is
thereby impaired. The money received or
paid is substituted in lieu of the slave property
abolished. Mr. Clay's worlds here re-
cur fresh to my memory in discussing a
proposition so novel: " No one of the
European powers—Great Britain, France,
nor any other of the powers which have
undertaken to abolish slavery in their col- |
onies—have ever ventured to do it without
making compensation to the owners."
They were under no such constitutional
obligation as I have referred to; but they
were under that obligation to winch all
men ought to bow—that obligation of eter-
nal justice, which declares that no man
ought to be deprived of his property with-
out full and just compensation for its value.
* * * * If the power is unrestricted, by
any constitutional injunction or inhibition,
the restriction imposed by the obligation of
justice remains; and I contend that that
would be sufficient to rerider it oppressive
and tyrannical to use the power, without at
the same time making the compensation."
He then proceeds to argue, that where the
Federal Government emancipates, the Constitution
entitles the owner to compensation
to the full extent of the value of the slaves
liberated. And the reasoning applies with
equal force to the State, where the State
undertakes to liberate the slaves of her
citizens.
But to return, Mr. President, to my pro-
position, that unless compensation is pro-
vided for the owners of slaves, this article
will violate the Constitution of the United
States, which prohibits a State from pass-
ing any law impairing the obligation of
contracts. I ask you, sir, upon how many
existing judgements, mortgages, bills of sale,
bonds and contracts will this article oper-
ate? Time would fail me to specify the
multitudinous host of existing contracts
and rights that would beaffected.
It will not do to say the property is
valueless. It may not be as valuable as it
was once. It is worth something. Who
will say what it may be worth one, two, or
three years hence? The value of the pro-
perty does not affect the principle involved
This Convention has no more constitutional
power to adopt this article, without provi-
ding compensation, than it has to pass any
law or ordinance expressly prohibited by
the Constitution of the United States.
The doctrine is so plain that the passage
of the article in its present form, without
compensation, will impair the obligation of
contracts, that it is a work of supereroga-
tion further to argue it.
In the great case of Ogden and Saun-
ders, (12 Wheat. 213) one of the judges
says, " A law which in any shape exempts
any portion of a man's property must im-
pair the obligation of the contract." And
the case of Forsyth vs. Chambury, R. M.
Charlton's Beports, page 324 and 331, fur- |
