It Is In order—I believe it is not, now In or-
der, there being already an amendment to
an amendment pending—I shall be obliged
to the Convention if they will give me an
opportunity to offer this as an amendment.
Mr. MARBURY, in any judgment the argu-
ment that this bill of rights has stood the
test of upwards of a century is a strong one,
although it may not be a conclusive one. I
know that it is an unpopular argument in the
present state of affairs, and I do not expect,
by anything that I may say upon this clause
of the bill of rights, or upon any other
clause, that I shall be able to convince the
minds of gentlemen who went for the glori-
ous "rule of twenty-six." I think they ought
to be designated as the "rule of twenty-six"
gentlemen, as the gentlemen who go for put-
ting a Constitution upon the State of Mary-
land by the votes of twenty-six men. I do
not know how many of them there are in this
Convention, but I want them all to have the
full honor and credit of supporting such a
proposition.
Now in coming to the discussion of this
bill of rights, as it is the first opportunity I
have had of addressing this Convention upon
the subject, I would like to state what I con-
ceive to be the nature of a bill of rights. It
seems to me that in this country there was
no absolute necessity for a bill of rights of
any kind. In England, whence we derived
this idea of a bill of rights, they have no
written Constitution—and a written charter
of rights of some kind was necessary there,
in order to enable the people to know specifi-
cally what they may, at all times, demand
of the Government, Now, sir, in this coun-
try we have written Constitutions, containing
specific articles, instructing the legislative,
the judicial and the executive departments of
the Government—what they cannot do, and
what they can do; and though both the bill
of rights and the Constitution are equally
parts of the organic law of the land, still, if
they ever come in conflict, which they very
often do, the Constitution, being the more
specific, and entering more into details as to the
character or the execution of the rights, is
the one to be taken as conclusive upon the
subject which may tie in dispute. Ton have
then to look to the Constitution as the specific
law for the government of the State.
The bill of rights is a mere declaration of
general principles. It is somewhat in the
nature of the Declaration of Independence
embodying a statement of broad, genera
principles. It does not undertake to legis-
late, or to bind down the State. If you will
read it you will find that each clause of this
bill of lights as it stood framed by the Con-
vention of 1776, is a declaration of some
general principle; that is the only true con-
struction that can be put upon it. The bill
of rights does not Bay, as gentlemen here
seem to argue, that you shall do so and so, |
but that you ought to do so and so; that such
and such is the correct principle that should
govern you. But they do not attempt to
bind you down to do so at all hazards. The
first clause of the article now under consider-
ation reads thus:
"That the levying of taxes by the poll is
grievous and oppressive, and ought to be
abolished."
Now why did they say that it was griev-
ous and oppressive? It was because history
had shown it to be so; because the experience
of foreign nations, wherever a poll tax was
attempted to be put upon the people, had
shown that in many instances the right to do
so had been grossly abused. Any gentle-
man here can easily conceive, in his own
mind, a case where the levying of such a tax
would be grievous and oppressive. Suppose
the Legislature had the power, and should
impose a poll tax of $50. That might be a
very small tax to impose upon some men, but
others might find it exceedingly grievous and
oppressive. That would be a case where a
poll tax would be grievous and oppressive
Now there is no conflict between the portion of
this article declaring a poll tax grievous and
oppressive, and that portion authorizing the
taxing every man according to the property
that lie holds. The argument against the
poll tax is that in the hands of injudicious
and unwise legislative bodies it may be ex-
ceedingly grievous and oppressive. We do
not here undertake to bind down the Legis-
lature; we merely express here what ought
to be our policy in binding it down when we
come to that portion of the Constitution de-
fining the powers and duties of the Legisla-
ture. The next clause of this article reads,
"That paupers ought not to be assessed for
the support of the Government."
That indicates that in the proper place in
the Constitution we should restrain the Legis-
lature from imposing taxes upon that particu-
lar class of persons. The article then goes
on to say—
"But every other person in the State, or
persons holding property therein, ought to
contribute his proportion of public taxes for
the support of the Government, according
to his actual worth in real or personal pro-
perty."
It says, "every person;" it makes no ex-
ception—every person holding property in
the State, of any kind or description, shall
be taxed, and that the tax ought to he in
proportion to his actual worth in real or per-
sonal property. Now can there be any pro-
position more clear and specific than that a
man who owns property in the State is bound
to pay a tax according to the amount of that
property? And is not the argument that
there are certain classes of men in this State
who do not own property you can reach,
fully met by the concluding clause of this
article ? |
