ecute an office with integrity, is none the less
bound to do it, is none the less guarantied
'to do it, by the circumstance that there is no
attempt to circumscribe him by the mere
terms of an oath. I therefore hold, in the first
place, that the imposition of an oath is un-
necessary.
On the other hand, it works mischief, in that
it adds the penalties and guilt and demorali-
zation of practical perjury to the violation of
official duties. No oath restrains a man who
is not intending properly to exercise the func-
tions of a public office. No oath has any in-
fluence upon a man of so little integrity that
he intends to abuse trusts which his fellow-
citizens have confided to him,
I am well aware, as many of my fellow-
members around me are, that these views are
entertained by gome thinkers, although they
have not so made their way among practical
legislators as to be practically applied in the
formation of constitutions and forms of gov-
ernment. The day will come, however, when
these views will have a more practical ap-
plication than at the present period. But so
long as the public mind of men and nations
appears to continue in the channel of requir-
ing these official oaths, I bold it to be the
part of sound political wisdom to confine them
to as narrow a compass as practicable. They
ought to be directed solely to the point of
guaranteeing the performance of the proper
functions of the office, and ought to be in ev-
ery sense and in every manner totally divested
of extraneous considerations, as to whether
the person taking it has done this, that or the
other, or will do this, that or the other con-
sideration relating to the period ante as well as
to the period post. It should have nothing to
do with what the man has done. When he
walks up to take the oath, and the duties of
the office are about to be devolved upon him,
the oath he ought to take ought to be upon
the mere point that he will discharge the du-
ties he assumes, and will discharge the same
with integrity, so help him God. There is
one strong consideration having a direct prac-
tical bearing, as you will presently see, upon
the terms of this proposed amendment, which
lies at the very root of our system, and which
forms a striking corroboration of this view,
The first axiom of political philosophy in this
country is that the people are sovereign, and
that their power underlies all our forms of
government; that it is from the power derived
from the people that public functions are
bestowed. When the people elect their offi-
cers, under their frame or constitution, making
its details square with any system that you
please, I suppose no one was ever beard of in
Maryland who ever imagined that under any
form of constitution nine-tenths of the officers
would not be elected by the people, or all of-
ficers in the community might nut be elected
by the people. The people elect the officers,
being sovereign, and as well at the founda-
40 |
tion of this assembly as at the foundation of
all other functionaries of the State; and 1
hold that the law ought to be so framed, as
well organic as statutory, as to approach as
near as possible to the gratification of the will
of the people whenever it is expressed in the
election of public officers.
Thus an office devolves upon the people.—
They elect a man to fill it. They being the
sovereign power, the supreme authority, quod
hoc, it is to be considered that in that election
they have exhausted all the questions that
ought to apply to the question of his politics.
They are the best judges whether he is fit or
not; they who are the very head and foun-
tain of his power. So that in framing an oath
here to be taken by the man whom the people
are to choose, we ought to take care so to
frame it as not to conflict unnecessarily with
the will of the people He ought to take an
oath to execute the duties of his office, because
that is the very performance for which the
people in electing him signified their desire at
his hands.
To be sure it ought to be provided that people
convicted of crime should not be eligible
to public office; and there are many other
cases which might be named in which people
ought to be excluded from office; but I hold
that it is not necessary to exclude him for mere
opinion's sake, on account of a' mere expres-
sion of views. That ought not to be such a
disqualification as to prevent the sovereign
people themselves from having their will ex-
ercised after it shall have been expressed at the
polls.
Hence the first and principal objection 1
have to this amendment is that the portion
which has been so much commented upon
to-day is in the past tense: "that I have
never directly or indirectly, by word, actor
deed, given any aid, comfort or encourage-
ment to those in rebellion against the United
States or the lawful authorities thereof, but
that I have been truly and loyally on the side
of the United States against those in armed
rebellion against the United States."
When the people have chosen a man for an
office for which they deem him fit in every par-
ticular, what boots it to the law, what boots
it to the State, who is interested but the peo-
ple themselves, as to what that man has done
in the past? The people say this man is fit,
and the one they want to serve them, and
since we pursue the policy of oath-taking at
all, what we desire is to impress upon him in
the form of an oath, the obligation that he
will discharge the duties of the office proper-
ly, faithfully and promptly in the future.
Another objection is that when we impose
an oath which has a mere reference to a man's
opinions, particularly when the display of
certain opinions may be excessively unpopu-
lar for the time being, we violate one of the
plainest and commonest maxima of law that
no man should be forced to become his own |
