Art. 25. That excessive bail ought not to be required, nor
excessive fines imposed, nor cruel or unusual punishment in-
flicted by the Courts of Law.
Art. 26. That all warrants, without oath, or affirmation,
to search suspected places, or to seize any person or property,
are grievous and oppressive; and all general warrants to
search suspected places, or to apprehend suspected persons,
without naming or describing the place, or the person in
special, are illegal, and ought not to be granted.
Art. 27. That no conviction shall work corruption of blood,
nor shall there be any forfeiture of the estate of any person
for any crime, except treason, and then only on conviction.
Art. 28. That a well regulated militia is the proper and
natural defence of a free government.
Art. 29. That standing armies are dangerous to liberty,
and ought not to be raised or kept up without the consent of
Art. 30. That in all cases and at all times the military
ought to be under strict subordination to and control of the
Art. ' 31. That no soldier shall in time of peace be quarter-
ed in any house without the consent of the owner, nor in time
of war. except in the manner prescribed by law.
Art. 32. That no person, except regular soldiers, mariners,
and marines, in the service of this State, or militia when in
actual service, ought in any case to be subject to, or punisha-
ble by, martial law.
Art. 33. That the independency and uprightness of Judges
are essential to the impartial administration of justice, and a
great security to the rights and liberties of the people;
wherefore the Judges shall not be removed, except for mis-
behavior, on conviction in a Court of Law, or by the Governor,
upon the address of the General Assembly; provided, that
two-thirds of all the members of each House concur in such
address. No Judge shall hold any other office, civil or mili-
tary, or political trust or employment of any kind whatso-
ever, under the Constitution or Laws of this State, or of the
United States, or any of them, or receive fees or perquisites
of any kind for the discharge of his official duties.
Art. 34. That a long continuance in the Executive Depart-
ments of power or trust, is dangerous to liberty; a rotation,
therefore, in those departments is one of the best securities of