ber ?" The judge then will be but a man, a bet-
ter man it is to be hoped, than many others; but
still subject to the universal law of his being, in-
fluenced by motives, perhaps of a higher order;
but nevertheless yielding to those which are most
influential in human conduct. Let us then in-
quire, what are the motives which are likely to
be presented to his mind. Doubtless in this enlighted
age, when public sentiment is to some
extent controlled and instructed by the precepts
of a pure religion and a sound morality, there is
no man who would not obey his sense of proprie-
ty, in the absence of any inducement to do wrong
He would therefore do right (that is to say, what
he honestly thought right,) if no temptation ex-
isted. Of course I do not speak of one who, by
indulgence in a dissolute, vicious course of life,
has demoralized his feelings, and blinded or blotted
out his moral sense. Such a man could not
be considered as an index of the character of the
officer; and any other would perform his duty in
the absence of any strong motive to induce a ne-
glect or violation of it. There is nothing in the
character of his duties to bias or warp an honest
mind. He has no patronage to whet the avarice
or excite the ambition of friends or relatives.
He confers no office. Candidates for such honors
must look elsewhere. His duty is only to act
judicially in coercing an officer to the perform-
ance of his duty, or in restraining him in any at-
tempt to exercise it oppressively. He acquires
no power for himself. His business is, to deter-
mine when others abuse theirs. He acquires no
riches by the exercise of his functions. He de-
cides upon the contested rights of others; but
whether his judgment shall be in favor of A, or
of B, no matter how large may be the amount
involved, not one farthing of it is to go, in any
event, into his own pocket. If a case occurs, in
his court, in which his own interests are involved
directly or remotely, he must retire from the
bench, and leave its decision to an impartial tri-
bunal, before which the judge is merged in the
suitor. He is to decide exclusively on the rights
of others. He does this by no voluntary act on
his part. He never goes in search of an oppor-
tunity to exercise his authority; he asks no man
to come before him for judgment. But, while he
cannot do this, if he would, he is as much the
slave of necessity on the other hand. He cannot,
if he would, avoid the exercise of his duties,
whenever they are put in requisition. He is
bound, whenever offences are charged, or injuries
alleged, to interpose his jurisdiction, and—often,
very, very often, under the most painful circum-
stances—to hear and decide upon the fiercest,
bitterest contests. There he sits, however. The
more tender feelings of his heart may excite his
anxiety, or his refined moral sense may feel a dis-
gust. But there he must sit, calm and unmoved,
with no license to indulge either, but compelled
to consult the stern dictates of his judgment and
knowledge. To these, every man may appeal
who chooses to think himself injured, whether he
be so in fact, or not. However unreasonable his
complaint, whomsoever it may affect, the judge
must listen, he must examine and decide it. Any |
one may appeal to him, but as the exponent of
the law, he must give the same response to all.
The law is made for all who come within its
provisions, and all are entitled to its equal, im-
partial and prompt administration.
It prescribes the line of his march; and his
feelings, his reputation and his peace of consci-
ence, will not allow him to stagger, to halt, or to
turn aside, merely from a desire to do wrong.—
Such then is the condition of the judge, if temptations,
inducements to do wrong, be kept out of the way.
And that they should be, as far as practicable, I now
assume as an admitted proposition. To enable us
to guard against them, we must understand what
they are likely to be?—those occasions, which
disturb the regular current of impartial justice,
whence are they likely to arise? Now, to all
controversies, there are at least two parties. It
may, it often does so happen, that one of them is
rich, powerful and influential; the other poor
and despised. The one has the distribution of
patronage or favor, which enables him to con-
trol, if not the opinion, at least the voice of a
large circle of expectants or dependants; the oth-
er is without influence, or friends.
Here is a case that appeals to the infirmities
of the judge. Yet the rules of law are the same
precisely, as if the character of the parties were
exactly reversed, or exactly alike; and therefore,
its even current should not, in any respect, be
disturbed. The humble man has the law on his
side; the powerful man has misconceived his
rights, or has intentionally encroached upon
those of his poor neighbor; or the point is a diffi-
cult or a nice one. But in any event, a decision
in favor of the opulent, popular litigant, will en-
sure commendation and favor for the judge:
while a decision against him, will excite the
censure and condemnation, not only of the great
man himself, but also of all those who speak and
act as he directs. The despised litigant on the
other hand, can neither accelerate nor retard the
progress of the judge towards reputation, honor,
and social enjoyment.
Is there not, then, an obvious temptation here?
I do not put the case of a Judge tempted to an act of
wilful corruption. It is not necessary for my ar-
gument. I take the case of a judge just as hon-
est as those we shall find in the class from which
we must select. Yet he bears about him the in-
firmities of our nature; its weaknesses, its follies
if you please. He, like all men, has his prejudi-
ces and his partialities; he, like them, must to
some extent, find his judgment under the domin-
ion of his passions, of his appetites, or of his self-
regard. Thus tempted from the line of his duty,
he must have some counteracting influence, to
fall back upon. What is it and how is it to be
supplied?
Sir, human invention may be scanned in vain,
imagination's widest, wildest range may be tra-
versed, to find any other effective means to ac-
complish the necessary object—one and one only
can be found—a conscious independence of the
judge. He must have this, and having it, he has
all that is necessary to quiet his apprehensions,
to subdue his prejudices and partialities, and to |
