come the victim of force or fraud. Those who
are peculiarly exposed, whether by reason of in-
firmity of character, physical or moral; from the
want of pecuniary means, or popular favor; or
from any other cause; aye, even from deformity
or depravity of moral principle—all, who are es-
pecially obnoxious to the excited passions or pre-
judices of others—are the objects of protection.
All, on the other hand, who would offend against
these, (for the vilest even, still have rights,) are
the subjects, not of its protecting, but of its re-
straining power. All, who would offend must be
restrained; or the very first and vital end of gov-
ernment will fail. Whether they be powerful,
abounding in wealth and influence; or elevated in
political power, and place; whether acting indi-
vidually, or in masses; all, who offend, must be
alike amenable to the laws. Now, sir, it is a
fact, as well known, in the history of human be-
ings, as the fact, that when respiration ceases,
death must be the consequence—a fact of univer-
sal observation—that the possession of power,
without some adequate restraint, begets a dispo-
sition to abuse it. No body can doubt that. It
has been a part of the infirmity of our being,
since the fall of Adam; and doubtless will be so,
to the end of time. The object of the law, which
is the mandate of government, is to restrain that
propensity. The object of all law is, to guard
and secure every citizen, however bumble, in
the enjoyment of all the privileges guaranteed to
him. Unfortunately, however, the law, though
good and wise, cannot execute itself. If a man
suffer actual injury in his person, or in his pro-
perty; it is of small account, to tell him there is
an act of Assembly on the statute book, which
says you shall have ample redress. If he can-
not go beyond the reading of the statute, if no
mode of enforcing his claim to redress be provi-
ded; he will not be the better, for the statute.
There must of course be some agency, some ma-
chinery, to carry the law into effect. You must
then have wholesome laws, and you must have
courts and judges to afford the means of execu-
ting them, and of bringing them within the reach
of those for whose protection they are made.
This proposition will be admitted on all hands.
If there be one of them disputable, I am not
aware of it. We must have a government of
force, to be administered by a military arm, or a
government of laws; if the latter, we must have
judges. Of course, the judge should execute
the duties of his station, so as to accomplish the
great end of his being. He should apply the law,
according to the purposes, for which it was en-
acted; to the protection of the weak against the
strong; to the punishment and restraint of those
who would commit wrong; and to the redress and
security of those, who are exposed to it.
Hence arises the great question for our solu-
tion, what sort of judge, in this state of things, is
most likely to perform the functions of the office effec-
tive and faithfully I What are the elements ne-
cessary, in the character of an officer, who is
thus to be the representative, and exponent of
the law ? My answer is, that the very first and
indispensable constituent, in the character of |
such a man is a consciousness of perfect indepen-
dence; a freedom from all motive to do wrong;
an exemption from all fear to do right. This
truth, to my mind, results from the very nature
of the fact, that he is to perform an odious duty;
odious to an influential opposition, in direct vio-
lation of its strongest feelings and dearest interests.
In any other matter, if you desired a man to
perform a given duty; you would certainly, as far
as possible, remove from him all motive to neg-
lect or abuse his trust; especially would you
guard against his being made to suffer for its
faithful discharge; you would, if possible, so ar-
range matters, as that advantage, and not loss,
should be the consequence of his fidelity. Any
other course would be as contrary to the com-
mon usage of prudent men; as it is to the philoso-
phy of our nature. Man is a creature of motive.
You might as soon expect an engine of the most
perfect mechanical construction, to perform its
intended operations, without the guiding and con-
trolling hand of the engineer; as expect the mind
of a human being to give existence to words or
actions, without some motive to act upon it. Ex-
perience, in every department of human life, de-
monstrates, that such is the character of every
sane mind, and ever has been, it is also true
that the very instincts of our nature prompt us
to regard, with peculiar interest, considerations
of personal advantage, or injury. Man, in his
best condition, is to some extent selfish,—wisely,
perhaps—nay, perhaps, necessarily—but certainly
such. If his existence is in peril, he is instinc-
tively impelled to avoid the danger; and he will
obey the impulse, unless it be counteracted by
some other of a higher and more imperative
character. It is the same, in regard to evils of
a nature less fatal, but in their degree quite as
unwelcome. It may be the impurity of our ani-
mal nature; it may be disowned by our purer in-
tellectual being. We certainly share it, in com-
mon with the brute creation. The horse you
ride, will be shy of the ditch, which looks too wide
for him to leap; until the spur overcomes the
dread, and urges him forward to his best attempt.
Sir, the man and the brute do not differ, in that
particular.
Let us then, Mr. President, consider what are
the motives (and what their force,) which are
likely to operate upon the mind, and regulate the
action of the judge we are about to create? I
will not treat of him as an abstraction, but as a
judge here in Maryland, in the nineteenth cen-
tury. This is the time, here is the place—and
the theatre—for the exercise of his duties. We
need not indulge in general speculations and the-
ories, based upon an assumed perfection of individual
character, and an elevated condition of
society, or upon any other assumption. We have
to deal with a practical question, and I hold the
propriety of acting, with an eye to the actual
condition in which we find men and matters.
We must consult our judgments, enlightened by
our experience and observation; and answer the
question which I have so often said should ever
be the object of our solicitude—" What will practically
produce the greatest good to the greatest num- |
