this subject, to show their conformity with his,
(Mr. McLane's.) The gentleman from Kent had
denied that Mr. Webster had sustained any such
doctrine. He knew him, he said, too well, to
believe for a moment that any thing could be
found in a speech of his, sustaining the gentle-
man. He had read the speech, and nothing like
it could be found in it. Mr. S. thought the gen-
tleman was mistaken, and had not read far enough
or with proper care. He begged leave to refer
him to the same speech, delivered by Mr. Web-
ster in reply to Mr. Calhoun, February 16th,
1833, on the bill "further to provide for the col-
lection of duties on imports." He particularly
invited the attention of the gentleman to that
part of it, found on page 176, of the 2nd volume
of Webster's speeches.
It is as follows:
" Mr. President, I concur so generally in the
very able speech of the gentleman from Virginia
near me, (Mr. Rives,) that it is not without diffi-
dence and regret that I venture to differ with
him on any point. His opinions, sir, are redo-
lent of the doctrines of a very distinguished
school, for which I have the very highest regard;
of whose doctrines I can say, what I can also say
of the gentleman's speech, that, while I concur
in the results, I must be permitted to hesitate
about some of the premises. I do not agree that
the Constitution is a compact between States in
their sovereign capacities. I do not agree that
in strictness of language it is a compact at all. But
I do agree that it is founded on consent or agree-
ment, or on compact, if the gentleman prefers that
word, and means no more by it than voluntary
consent or agreement. The Constitution, sir, is
not a contract, but the result of a contract, mean-
ing by contract no more than assent. Founded
on consent, it is a government proper. Adopted
by the agreement of the people of the United
States, when adopted, it has become a Constitu-
tion." And again, he says, in the same place,
" So the Constitution of the United States founded
in or on the consent of the people, may be said
to rest on compact or consent, but is itself
not the compact, but the result. When the peo-
ple agree to erect a government, and actually
erect it, the thing is done and the argreement is
at an end. The compact is executed and the end
designed by it, attained. Henceforth the fruit
of the agreement exists, but the agreement is
merged in its own accomplishment."
Can language be more explicit? And does
not the authority cover the whole ground of the
debate, and leave the gentleman without a spot
to rest on ? But the authorities are more explic-
it, if possible, atill. Remember that the point
under consideration, is, whether our State Con-
stitution can be considered and treated as a con-
tract. This is the true point. This is the point,
without which the gentleman's whole fabric
crumbles and falls. He has said, very emphati-
cally, in reference to a remark uttered by the
gentleman from Cecil, that he never before had
heard such an opinion expressed, until this day,
Anno Domini eighteen hundred and fifty-one !

With the same emphasis, he, Mr. SPENCER, would
repeat, that he had never before heard any state-man
or jurist contend that our State Constitu-
titutions were to be continued as compacts or
agreements, and" he was glad to find, that in this,
Judge Story sustained him. He then cited and
read from sec. 337 of his, (Story's,) commentaries.
Mr. CHAMBERS here said, I deny that Judge
Story says any such thing.
Mr. SPENCER. I say he does.
Mr. CHAMBERS read the preceding sentence.
Mr. SPENCER. It would be necessary for him
to read a number of pages to show that Judge
Story was treating the question of compact in
government. He, (Mr. S...) would assert without
fear of successful contradiction, that he was fully
sustained by him. At the section referred to,
Judge Story says, after elucidating the question
of compact, and the views of distinguished men,
"no such claim has ever, (at least to our knowl-
edge,) been asserted by any jurist or statesman,
in respect to any of our State Constitutions."
Again in sec. 338, he says, "the true view to be
taken of our State Constitutions, is, that they are
forms of government, ordained and established
by the people in their original sovereign capacity.
The language of nearly all these State Constitu-
tions, is, that the people do ordain and establish
this Constitution." And again, at sec. 349, he
says, "the subject has been thus far considered
chiefly in reference to the point, how far gov-
ernment is to be considered a compact, in the
sense of a contract, as contra-distinguished from
an act of solemn acknowledgement or assent,
and how far our State Constitutions are to be
deemed such contracts, rather than fundamental
laws, prescribed by the sovereign power. The
conclusion to which we have arrived, is, that a
State Constitution is no further to be deemed a
compact, than it is a matter of consent by the
people, binding them to obedience to its requi-
sitions, and that its proper character is that of a
fundamental law, prescribed by the will of a
majority of the people of the State, (who are en-
titled to prescribe it,) for the government and
regulation of the whole people." And again at
sec. 340, he says, "a State Constitution is then
in a just and appropriate sense, not only a law,
but a supreme law, for the government of the
whole people." And again, "it would be an
extraordinary use of language, to consider a dec-
laration of rights in a Constitution, and especial-
ly of rights which it proclaims to be unalienable
and indefeasable, to be a matter of contract."
How now does the question stand. The gentle-
man, in order to show that the majority have no
right to change their form of government, except in
the prescribed mode, took the ground that they
could bind themselves by a Constitution, which be-
came a compact or contract. But he is contradie-
ted by the authorities. They all show that govern-
ment is not a compact, but a fundamental law,
prescribed by the supreme power of the State—
that the supreme power have at all times a right
to change and remodel their form of government
in the manner they may appoint—and that the