It is hoped, that the two honorable members
are answered, and that their difficulty has vanish-
ed.
The gentleman from Kent, in order to justify
himself in the position which he occupies on this
question, as he has done on another occasion,
contends that a State Constitution is to be con-
sidered as a compact or contract. If he can
make this out, then it is clear that the people
cannot alter it, except in the mode provided.
But if he fail in this, then his whole ground is ta-
ken from under him, and the point must be given
up. It will be remembered, that he, (Mr. S.,)
gome days ago, stated that it appeared to him
strange that our State Constitutions were treated
as compacts or contracts. It was new to him, and
the idea was all wrong. He then referred to Jus-
tice Blackistone to define the difference between
law and compact. His point was, that govern-
ments were founded in compact, but as soon as
organised, they cease to have such a character
and become fundamental law. He also then
said, that in reference to the Constitution of the
United States, there was, in this country, many
who held it to be a compact. The distinguished
member from Cecil, had taken the same position
with him, as to the foundation of government,
and had asserted, that after it was organised, it
became organic law and was no longer a compact.
In this, his friend from Cecil, was too explicit to
admit of doubt. He had never held that govern-
ment was not founded on agreement. His doc-
trine was, that the agreement terminated when
the government was ordained, and yet, the gentle-
man from Kent, (Mr. Chambers,) had spent along
time in asserting a proposition which no one dis-
puted, that government was founded in compact;
and then in order to sustain his idea that the
State Constitutions are compacts, he had depart-
ed from the question, and sought authority in the
conflicting doctrines of distinguished statesmen,
as to whether the Constitution of the United
States were a compact. It is unquestionably
true, that this is the doctrine of very many of the
most distinguished statesmen of the southern
school. But does Judge Story assert such a pro-
position.' Does he any where hold to such a doc-
trine, in reference to the Constitution of the
United States? It is true that lie has elaborated
the subject, and has devoted many pages to the
notice of Judge Tucker, and other writers. But
afterhaving shown his, (Judge T's,) opinions, he
proceeds to criticise and to show their error. In
section 319 of his commentaries, he says, "such
is a summary of the reasoning of the learned au-
thor, (Judge Tucker,) by which, he has under-
taken to vindicate his views of the nature of the
Constitution." And again in section 320, he
says, "it will be sufficient for all the practical
objects we have in view, to suggest the difficul-
ties of maintaining its leading positions, lo ex-
pound the objections, which have been urged
against them." He then proceeds in the follow-
ing sections, to point out the consequences which
must flow from such premises, and the obvious
deductions, that "if it be a compact between the
States, it operates as a mere treaty, and binds
such State only, so long as its consent continues;

that such State has the right to judge for itself,
in relation to the nature, extent and obligations
of the instrument, without being at all bound by
the interpretation of the Federal Government, or
by any other State; and that each retains the
power to withdraw from the confederacy, and to
dissolve the connection when such shall be its
choice, and suspend the operations of the Fede-
ral Government, and nullify its acts when in its
own opinion, the exigency of the case may re-
quire." Will the learned gentleman consent to
adopt such conclusions as these. He has cited
Judge Story to prove his position, that the Con-
stitution is a compact. But it will be found, on
examination, that it is not the opinion of Judge
Story from which he can derive support, but on
the contrary, the doctrines of jurists whose views
are controverted throughout by the distinguished
author—will the gentleman hold to them, or to
Judge Story ? To which class does he belong ?
Is he willing to take the consequences, as illus-
trated by Judge Story of the doctrine of com-
pact? That distinguished jurist, leaves no
doubt upon this question. He positively nega-
tives the idea of the Constitution, being treated
or considered as a compact. In sec. 339, he says,
"a Constitution is in fact a fundamental law or
basis of government, and falls strictly within the
definition of law, as given by Mr. Justice Blak-
istone." It will be borne in mind, that this is the
very authority which was quoted by him, (Mr.
S.,) in the earlier part of this debate. "It is,
(says the author,) "a rule of action prescribed
by the supreme power in a State: regulating the
rights of the whole community. It is a rule as
contra-distinguished from a temporary or sudden
order—permanent, uniform and universal. It is
also called a rule to distinguish it from a com-
pact on agreement; for a compact is a promise
proceeding from us; law is a command directed
to us." And in sec. 340, he says, "it is in this
light that the language of the Constitution of the
United States, manifestly contemplates it; for
it declares, (article 6th,) "that this Constitution
and the laws, made under the authority of the
United States shall be the supreme law of the
land."
And so at sec. 348, in speaking of the manner
in which it was understood by the great men who
accomplished the revolution, he says, "they sup-
posed from the moment it became a Constitution
it ceased to be a compact and became a funda-
mental law." And in sec. 353, he emphatical-
ly says, "there is nowhere found upon the face
of the Constitution, any clause intimating it to
be a compact, or in any wise providing for its
interpretation, as such."
Such are the conclusions of the author on
whom the gentleman relies. He utterly annihi-
lates the idea of a Constitution being considered
acompact. It is not for him, (Mr. S.,) to ex-
press any opinion of the soundness of Judge Sto-
ry's conclusions, as to the character and effect of
the Constitution of the United States. His only
purpose now, was to show, that the gentleman
is not sustained by the author in his position.
Mr. S. then said, his learned friend, from Ce-
cil, had cited the opinions of Mr. Webster on