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expires, or the End for which it was made is fully answered, unless
it is continued by another Law." But we cannot see how this Dis-
tinction can any way serve your Excellency's Purpose; for if the
former Part of that Distinction be applied to the Law of 1715, that
is evidently no such Law as must continue in force until it be re-
pealed; and there is in the Body of it according to your own Admis-
mission, a Time limited for it's Duration, which makes it but a tem-
porary Law, expressly according to the latter Part of that Distinc-
tion: Nor can we apprehend how that Distinction can avail your
Excellency, so as to make the Law of 1722 a perpetual Law for
want of a Limitation given either to it, or in it, to the Law of 1715,
and from whence we suppose it may be endeavoured to be inferred,
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L. H. J.
Liber No. 46
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that the Law of 1715 is thereby made perpetual; for however true
in general that Distinction may be, yet we must humbly contend
the present Case is not within it as to your Excellency's Purpose,
because altho' in the Enacting a Law in the first Instance, it must
necessarily be supposed from the not giving it a Limitation, to be
the Intention of the Legislature that it should be perpetual, unless
it be in it's nature made but for a temporary Purpose, yet we appre-
hend there is no room for the like Supposition in the present Dispute :
The Law of 1715 is by a Clause in the Body of it temporary only,
this being near expiring, is by a Law in 1722 (for we need not per-
plex this Question by taking notice of the intermediate reviving Law
of 1719) revived and continued in full Force, without expressing
any Term of Continuance either for the Law of 1715, or for that
reviving Law of 1722; the Case being thus circumstanced, if there
be no necessity to suppose it the Intention of the Legislature that
the Law of 1715, should by that of 1722 be made perpetual, this
Case is then clearly without that Distinction as to your Purpose, and
cannot therefore be affected by it; and that Law may, notwithstanding
any Circumstances in this Case, have been but temporary and long
since expired; and to that Purpose, when that Law in 1715 was
revived by that in 1722, the Clause of Limitation in the former was
likewise revived with the rest of that Law, and has as much Force
and Effect as any other Part of it, and may consequently be taken
as a new Term for its Duration, at the End of which it has expired,
for want of another Law to revive and continue it afterwards, and
we think this temporary Revival of the former Law, is not only a
sufficient Reason for the Legislature's making that reviving Law
in 1722, but will also satisfy and give Effect and meaning to the
Words " Revived and Continued in full Force," and will conse-
quently remove that necessary Supposition of an intended Perpetuity
before mentioned; and then this last Law having fully " answered
the End for which it was made " by giving the former Law a further
Duration for three Years, is we think according to your Excellency's
Distinction, and wherein you admit that a Law having no particular
Limitation may yet be temporary, certainly expired; and by this
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p. 507
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