

expires, or the End for which it was made is fully answered, unless it is continued by another Law." But we cannot see how this Distinction can any way serve your Excellency's Purpose; for if the former Part of that Distinction be applied to the Law of 1715, that is evidently no such Law as must continue in force until it be repealed; and there is in the Body of it according to your own Admission, a Time limited for it's Duration, which makes it but a temporary Law, expressly according to the latter Part of that Distinction: Nor can we apprehend how that Distinction can avail your Excellency, so as to make the Law of 1722 a perpetual Law for want of a Limitation given either to it, or in it, to the Law of 1715, and from whence we suppose it may be endeavoured to be inferred, that the Law of 1715 is thereby made perpetual; for however true in general that Distinction may be, yet we must humbly contend the present Case is not within it as to your Excellency's Purpose, because altho' in the Enacting a Law in the first Instance, it must necessarily be supposed from the not giving it a Limitation, to be the Intention of the Legislature that it should be perpetual, unless it be in it's nature made but for a temporary Purpose, yet we apprehend there is no room for the like Supposition in the present Dispute: The Law of 1715 is by a Clause in the Body of it temporary only, this being near expiring, is by a Law in 1722 (for we need not perplex this Question by taking notice of the intermediate reviving Law of 1719) revived and continued in full Force, without expressing any Term of Continuance either for the Law of 1715, or for that reviving Law of 1722; the Case being thus circumstanced, if there be no necessity to suppose it the Intention of the Legislature that the Law of 1715, should by that of 1722 be made perpetual, this Case is then clearly without that Distinction as to your Purpose, and cannot therefore be affected by it; and that Law may, notwithstanding any Circumstances in this Case, have been but temporary and long since expired; and to that Purpose, when that Law in 1715 was revived by that in 1722, the Clause of Limitation in the former was likewise revived with the rest of that Law, and has as much Force and Effect as any other Part of it, and may consequently be taken as a new Term for its Duration, at the End of which it has expired, for want of another Law to revive and continue it afterwards, and we think this temporary Revival of the former Law, is not only a sufficient Reason for the Legislature's making that reviving Law in 1722, but will also satisfy and give Effect and meaning to the Words "Revived and Continued in full Force," and will consequently remove that necessary Supposition of an intended Perpetuity before mentioned; and then this last Law having fully "answered the End for which it was made" by giving the former Law a further Duration for three Years, is we think according to your Excellency's Distinction, and wherein you admit that a Law having no particular Limitation may yet be temporary, certainly expired; and by this

L. H. J.
Liber No. 46

p. 507