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| 50. COMMUNISTS AND THE PUBLIC Of the President's Cabinet> Wallace and Ickes have frequently been used by the Communists for specific purposes* It Is felt that both are basically liberal, rather than Communist-minded,, but that they are subject to undue pressure from the Party., The writer feels that this general section on government agencies is weaker than the rftgt *? t.h« Pftpm»t.n Except for Josephine Adams^ Harold Young» Alger Hiss, Nathan Witt, Harold White and Edwin S^ Smlth^ the information,——' ootained was not from sources of unimpeachable accuracy*/ It is feit that the data given is correctj otherwise it would not have been used, but it is general rather than circumstantial * As for agencies^ the material obtained ^on the war agencies and the State Department Is of better quality than the rest. None, however, has the precision ana detail which is desired and which has been possible in other sections of the Report * Information of the quality sought is available, but the writer has been unable to surmount the barriers raised by the groups which have this information* 3) Communism in the Armed Services* The problem of Communism in the Armed Services caused public comment several times during the War* The most important items were the abolition of the Communist Department of the Office of Naval Intelligence; the crippling of anti-«Communist activities by Army Intelligence; the commissioning of Communist officers; and the indocrination of the Army through the Army orientation courses. The information obtained on this subject, although generalk is accurate*. It was obtained from a former official of the Foreign Economic Administration,, who had contact with high military sources. Most of the Communist infiltration in the Armed Services was from the top down, rather than the reverse. Pressure originated at the Unite House, as part of the general campaign t^ please the Soviet Union* It was transmitted to ambitious officers who felt that the way to promotion lay in pleasing high civilian sources. Thus, the crippling of Army Intelligence would proceed from the Thite House, through John McCloy, assistant secretary of War, to General McLarney, and thus through channels* Communist infiltration of the Army Orientation course would proceed through General Osborne to Colonel Herzberg and then through channels. Old army men winced and privately com- plained about the procedures» but they were helpless to do anything about the situation. The men named are not necessarily even sympathetic to Communism, although the informant is most doubtful about Herzbergf but they were politically ambitious and willing to conform to an Administration policy of promoting amity with the U.S%S*R« Their consciences were salved by the fact that at the time, Communists were loyal to the war effort (because we were allies of the Soviets)* It must be noted that one army officer involved in the chain of events which permitted Communists to advance is now delegated to organize the Intelligence Service of the State Department (Col. Frank McCormick). This last point of information, and a note that Oscar L* Chapnan from the Dept. of the Interior was also concerned with Army Orienta- tion courses, comes from a different source than the material preceding it. This source is believed accurate, but not so well connected as the first* In'the Army itself, Communists tried to gravitate into positions v&ere they could influence other soldiers or the civilian populations of occupied countries. The Daily rprker has indicated that its members had obtained |