20 	The Compact of 1785

	The second point is more complicated. When this opinion
	was written in 1838, the District of Columbia extended
	into Virginia. Maryland, by ch. 45 of 1791, and Virginia,
	by its ch. 32 of 1789, had each ceded territory to the United
	States, so that the District of Columbia then embraced
	lands formerly belonging to both states. It therefore was
	entirely accurate for the Court to say that Congress had
	received as to the District of Columbia the rights of both
	states to modify the Compact.

	In 1846, however, Congress re-ceded to Virginia all lands
	within the District which had originally come from Vir
	ginia, on the finding that the District of Columbia would
	never need that much territory (ch. 64 of the Virginia
	Acts of 1845-46; 9 Stat. Large 35) . The question after 1846
	would have been, therefore, would Congress have been
	required to secure the joint action of the State of Virginia
	in order to modify the Compact for that part of the river
	opposite the District of Columbia? Congress after 1846 still
	had whatever rights the Maryland General Assembly had
	formerly had, over the Compact within this particular area.
	It had re-ceded to Virginia, however, all rights in the
	former Virginia lands.

	Stated otherwise, the question is this: May Congress
	now, by unilateral action, modify or repeal the Compact
	as it affects the District of Columbia? The question is a
	highly important one, for the answer to it would suggest
	an answer to the companion question: May either of the
	states by unilateral action modify or repeal the Compact?
	It seems highly unlikely that the Supreme Court would
	ever require that Congress secure the assent of the State
	of Virginia to making a change in the Compact. It is doubt
	ful if Congress feels itself at all bound by the Compact,
	yet the language of the Court in the Alexandria Canal
	Company case leaves the whole question open.

	D. State v. Hoofman (1856). By ch. 148 of 1845 Maryland
	prohibited fishing in the Potomac River during March,