Judicial History 19 ferred by that compact. But the citizens as such, indi vidually, were in no just sense the parties to it; those parties were the two states, of which they were citi zens. The same power which established it, was com petent either to annul or to modify it. Virginia and Maryland, then, if they had retained the portions of territory respectively belonging to them on the right and left banks of the Potomac; could have so far modified this compact as to have agreed to change any or all of its stipulations. They could, by their joint will, have made any improvement which they chose, either by canals along the margin of the river, or by bridges or aqueducts across it, or in any other manner whatsoever. When they ceded to Congress the portions of their territory, embracing the Potomac river, within their limits, whatsoever the legislatures of Virginia and Maryland could have done by their joint will, after that cession could be done by Congress; subject only to the limitations imposed by the acts of cession. We are satisfied, then, that the act of Congress, which granted the charter to the Alexandria Canal Company, is in no degree a violation of the compact between the states of Virginia and Maryland .... What the Court said was that since Maryland and Vir ginia jointly could have modified the Compact at any time, Congress after the cession of the territory embraced in the District of Columbia succeeded to the right of both states so far as the District was concerned, and therefore it was within the power of Congress to modify the Com pact within the District of Columbia. Two things may be noted about the decision. First, when Congress passed the act authorizing the Alexandria Canal Company to construct the canal it did not specifically modify or repeal the Compact of 1785. The Canal Company act did not even refer to the Compact. Therefore, if the Canal Company Act did repeal or modify the Compact so far as concerned this portion of the District, it was only as a matter of necessary implication.