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| 44a COMMUNISM IN LABOR Thus, it is not possible to answer simply whether or not the Communists have controlling power in the C.I.0. Much depends on the issues which arise,. To take an extreme Case, they would not be able to depose Phil^ip Hurray and replace him by a known Communist. They could not win any issue where the overwhelming majority of workers were definitely opposed to their stand. On the other hand, where issues can be confused so as to salve the consciences of opportunist or fellow-traveling union officers, where questions ariae about international matters, political problems, or other situations only indirectly connected with labor, they can usually have their way. The technique of ob*» fuscation, so successfully practiced with front groups, works equally well here. The task of reaching these conclusions was difficult, because the period of the investigation was largely a period of war. At this time, the interests of the left and the right so fully co-incidad that it was difficult to discern the strength of each group. With the conclusion of the War, issues are arising and sharp divergences are inevitable«. It will be to the interests of Pressman and Abt to smooth over difficulties and to try to gain an appearance of unanim- ity. This would be particularly the case with the next C.I.O. Convention, where Presidents of unions may not always be able to control their delegates if the issues are sharply defined as between left and right* Finally, it must be noted that political loyalties of a union may fluctu- ate in the course of years* This is particularly the case where there are strong factions battling for control. Many of the unions listed as doubtful or dis- puted were definitely left-wing a few years ago. Likewise, other unions have shifted to the left. Probably the extensive changes brought about by the end of the War will affect the political complexion of all but the extremes of right and left, and this in an unpredictable manner, All that can be done at this moment is to try to distinguish exclusively Party Line policies, and to note the unions which consistently follow the Line. Summary«. The data presented in this chapter indicate at least that the Communists have a strong political interest in capturing the labor movement« Their primary purpose is political, propaganda, and financial. They also hope to gain members from the ranks of labor. At the moment they are weak in the A.F. of L. The C.I.O. situation is more confused, and their strength greater than is often realized, riith the data analysed above, Communist infiltration into PAC and WFTU should not be the fruzale which it might otherwise seem to be. At the same time, it must be remembered that all their achievements rest upon the shallow foundation of mass indifference and ineptitude, pealing with indifferent and untrained workers, Communists estimate that they need not more than five per cent of the members to be Communist, and they will control a local. But where- workers have been trained and inspired to fight for their rights—-and the A.CJT.U. and Catholic priests interested in labor have so trained and inspired them-—they have been able to put down this disruptive minority. The problem of Communism in the C.I.O. will be solved at the local, not the national level. The Church could aid materially in the right solution of this difficult problem. |