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| 44. COMMUNISM IN LABOR K At the extreme left, we have one large and many small unions. The large Communist-control led union is the United Electrical Workers, wl}ich is closely held tooth at fee top and in most of the locals. Of the small unions, several are important because of the strategic nature of the industry affected. Thus, when Joseph Curran threatens to holdup shipping because of a political issue (bringing back high-point troops f:^Europe—this enuntiated on Nov. }.,1945, immediately after his return from Moscow——Apparently the Soviet wants Arner*- ican troop*' out of Europe), he shows the power of the National Maritime Union. Other marine and transport unions, as well as communications unions, could interfere seriously with either peacetime industrial effort or wartime activ- ities. Communist infiltration into the secretarial field (Office and Profes- sional Workers) and the building service fields (mostly A.?, of L,) has been found most useful for the purposes of getting information; Even unions hostile to Communists often employ UOFrfA clerks and secretaries, The Federal Workers have access to government files where they are employed. If Communists had clear control of unions which are today uncertain or disputed (Oil Workers, Utility Workers), their power would be even greater.' The Pie-Casting division of the Mine, Mill, and Smelter workers is very important in time of war* Finally, the Longshoremen are strategic, as was noted when a Communist-support ec strike tied up New York harbor. Accordingly, it appears that the small Com- munist unions would be important as a political weapon, should the Soviet Union decide to use labor pressure upon the United States, Such suggest ings are not war-mongering, since the Curran threat is but the most open of the many threats which have appeared in the Daily Worker. On confused political issues (but not, of course, where the intereste of the United States are open- ly involved), it is probable that the left group could muster enough votes from the uncertain and disputed groups to amass a total of 120 votes. The problem group includes the powerful United Automobile Workers, whose war membership soared past the,mi 11 ion level; the Amalgamated Clothing Worker?; and the Marine and Shipbuilding Workers, The Auto situation is highly confut- ing, with a Reuther tight-wing faction battling a Frank ens teen-Addes left-wing group, and H,J. Thomas, the president, as a balancing force. Within the pas'-, year, however, Thomas swung sharply to the left because he felt that Reuther was threatening his position. In appointments, caucuses, and public state- ments he has revealed this tendency. Thus* the Daily Worker, on Oct. 31, 1945. has a lengthly account of his letter to president Truman, There he takes tbe Communist position on such M lab or matters** as "exact observation of the Pots- dam principles in Germany," "international control over the development of a- tomic energy," "the danger of maintenance of overwhelming armament by the Uni- ted States, " and his opposition to military training "as a threat to our demo- cracy ,** In the case of Hillman, the left swing involved deliberate choice rather than a devperate effort to retain a job threatened because of poor administration. Hillman's union is thoroughly right-wing and he is strongly entrenched. Hence his recent honeymoon with the leftists is pure opportunism, without the excuse of self-preservation. John Green, of the Shipbuilding Workers, faces a still different problem. The secretary of the Union, shrewd, fellow-traveling Philip van Gelder, built a left-wing political machine which took over the convention last year. At this moment, Green is battling "to re- gain power. On a straight labor issue, these three unions would probably add their 55 votes to the 80 right-wing votes« But on international affairs, dom- estic political matters, and other suoh questions much discussed in PAC md WFTU circles, it is at this writing probable that only Green would vote with the right, and that the remaining 41 votes would side with the leftist groups. On organizational questions, where policy was only indirectly involved, this middle group would in all likelihood be in a position to incline the balance either way. At the present moment, it is practically certain that Thomas and Hillman would side with the left in such a situation. |