1994 LAWS OF MARYLAND

been ascribed to it by judges in cases interpreting the elements of the current statutory
forms of storehouse breaking but should also expressly include most of the structures that
are currently included in the definition of the term "structure" in Article 27, § 5(e) of the
Code.

It should be noted that there are three differences between the definition of the
term "storehouse'' in this bill and the term "structure" in Article 27, § 5(e) of the Code.

First, the definition of the term "storehouse" does not include the terms "vehicle",
''motor vehicle", and "tent", which are included in the definition of the term "structure"
in Article 27, § 5(e) of the Code. These terms are not included in the definition of the
term "storehouse" because the Committee believes that the burglary laws are intended to
reach an offense involving a vehicle or tent only if the vehicle or tent is a "dwelling", as
this term has been defined in Kanaras v. State, 54 Md. App. 568, cert. denied, 297 Md.
109 (1983) and other related case law. If a vehicle or tent does not constitute a
"dwelling", then an offense involving the breaking and entering of a vehicle or tent will
not constitute a burglary offense. The Committee believes that other laws, such as the
laws governing theft and malicious destruction of property, are intended to reach conduct
involving the breaking and entering of a vehicle or tent that does not constitute a
"dwelling".

Second, the definition of the term "storehouse" does not include a "public bridge",
which is included in the definition of the term "structure" in Article 27, § 5(e) of the
Code, because the Committee does not believe that a public bridge will ever constitute a
dwelling or storehouse.

Third, the definition of the term "storehouse" does include a "trailer", which is not
included as a specific item in the definition of the term "structure" in Article 27, § 5(e) of
the Code, because the Committee believes that a trailer may, under certain
circumstances, constitute a storehouse.

The Committee does not intend that this bill limit or "freeze" further development
of the meaning of the terms "break", "enter", "dwelling", and "storehouse" in case law.
Rather, the Committee expects that the meaning of these terms will continue to be
clarified as appropriate in future case law.

29.

(A)     A PERSON MAY NOT BREAK AND ENTER THE DWELLING OF ANOTHER
WITH THE INTENT TO COMMIT THEFT OR A CRIME OF VIOLENCE.

(B)      A PERSON WHO VIOLATES THIS SECTION IS GUILTY OF THE FELONY OF
BURGLARY IN THE FIRST DEGREE AND ON CONVICTION IS SUBJECT TO
IMPRISONMENT FOR NOT MORE THAN 20 YEARS.

30.

(A) A PERSON MAY NOT BREAK AND ENTER THE STOREHOUSE OF ANOTHER
WITH THE INTENT TO COMMIT THEFT, A CRIME OF VIOLENCE, OR ARSON IN THE
SECOND DEGREE.

- 3150 -           

Ch. 712