HARRY HUGHES, Governor

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his approval of the bill for that reason.

While I agree with the Attorney General's Opinion that this
bill violates the separation of powers clause of the
Constitution, I also believe that it would infringe on the power
of the Executive Branch as well as the Judiciary and violates
other provisions of the Constitution.

At least three provisions of the bill are, in my view,
subject to constitutional challenge:

1.   The provision allowing a committee of the General
Assembly to suspend the adoption of a regulation which is
otherwise authorized by statute to become effective at an earlier
date constitutes a transfer to a committee of the General
Assembly the power to alter the effective date of legislation --
a power which can be exercised only by concurrent action by both
houses of the General Assembly subject to the power of
gubernatorial veto.

2.  The provision of the bill permitting the General
Assembly, by law, to reject a regulation is constitutionally
objectionable insofar as it purports to make this action
effective notwithstanding a gubernatorial veto until the veto has
been sustained or the time for a legislative override of the veto
elapses. The effect of this provision is to permit an action of
the General Assembly to become effective as law for a potentially
extended period of time, even though the purported law has not
been signed by the Governor nor has the gubernatorial veto been
overridden.

3.   The provision of the bill permitting the AELR Committee
to delay the effectiveness of any regulation for 45 days for any
reason plainly contravenes not merely the provisions of the
Constitution relating to the gubernatorial veto but also those
vesting legislative authority in the two houses of the General
Assembly.

In addition, all three provisions in my view contravene
Article VIII of the Declaration of Rights relating to the
separation of powers and restrain my ability to "take care that
the Laws are faithfully executed" as required by Article II,
Section 9 of the Constitution.

In reaching these conclusions I am not unmindful of concerns
which have led the General Assembly to propose other legislation
containing various forms of "legislative veto" power. I am also
aware that the General Assembly has been in some measure
encouraged in this course by expressions contained in an Opinion
of Attorney General Burch on May 26, 1978 (1978 Opinion) which
took the view that House Bill 619 of the 1978 Session, which
would have permitted the AELR Committee to disapprove regulations
subject to override by joint resolution of the General Assembly,
was "not clearly unconstitutional"; and a letter from Attorney