HARRY HUGHES, Governor

5225

Unfortunately, this purpose is obscured by the addition of
the words "when exercising reasonable care." When a person
is exercising reasonable care, he cannot be liable for
negligence; only if there is a lack of reasonable care will
an action for negligence lie. Baltimore Transit Co. v.
Prinz, 215 Md. 398, 403 (1958).

Section 19-103(b)(1) seems to say that an operator is
not liable in tort if he exercises reasonable care. But,
under such circumstances, he would not be liable in tort in
any event, be it for negligence or gross negligence. On the
other hand, § 19-103(c)(l) would appear to impose liability
on the owner or lessee of the vehicle even if the operator
were not negligent. This is more than strict liability and
simply could not have been intended. Moreover, under §
19-103(c)(1) it is unclear whether the owner or lessee is to
be liable jointly or solely for actions that involve gross
negligence.

Because the use in the same paragraph of the mutually
exclusive words "tortious act or omission" and "exercising
reasonable care" creates an obvious ambiguity in the bills,
this might lead a court to somehow construe the bills in a
reasonable fashion. Kindley v. Governor of Maryland, 289
Md. 620 (1981).

However, we can give no assurance how a court would
construe the bills and whether it would construe them so as
to exempt an operator from liability for negligence and
impose only that liability on the owner or lessee of the
vehicle.

Very truly yours,
Stephen H. Sachs
Attorney General

House Bill No. 165

AN ACT concerning

Baltimore City - Sheriffs - Expense Allowance

FOR the purpose of altering the annual expense allowance of
the Sheriff, assistant and undersheriffs, and deputy
sheriffs in Baltimore City.

BY repealing and reenacting, with amendments,