HARRY HUGHES, Governor

167

language added to this and, where necessary,
corresponding sections in other titles of this
article to state expressly a power that, in part,
presently is only implied — that the Board may
deny a license to an applicant who violates a
disciplinary provision applicable to the
appropriate license.

Also as to the introductory language of
subsection (a) of this section, the fourth
sentence of present Art. 32, § 5(c) states that
the Board may revoke a limited license to
practice dentistry "at any time for cause". The
Commission to Revise the Annotated Code has
interpreted this language to mean that the Board
may take action against a holder of a limited
license to practice dentistry for the same causes
as against a holder of a general license to
practice dentistry. This revision is called to
the attention of the General Assembly.

Subsection (a)(1) of this section is revised in
the standard language used in corresponding
provisions governing other health occupations.
Although present Art. 32, § 11(c) appears to make
only certain forms of fraud or deception in
obtaining a license grounds for discipline, it is
both fundamental to the licensing scheme and
implicit in the present law that any fraud or
deception in obtaining a license is a proper
basis for disciplining a licensee.

Subsections (a)(2) and (b)(2) of this section are
new language added to conform to similar
provisions governing other health occupations.
They state a fundamental ground for disciplining
a licensee. For examples of these provisions in
the present law, see present Art. 43, §
130(h)(1), as to physicians, and present Art.
43, § 266A(c)(1)(iii), as to pharmacists.

In subsection (a)(4) of this section, the present
reference to a certified copy of the docket
entries that relate to a criminal conviction
being conclusive evidence of the crime is deleted
as unnecessary.

In subsection (a)(8) of this section, present
Art. 32, § 11(g), which establishes employing or
making use of "advertising solicitors or free
publicity press agents" as a ground for
discipline, is revised to make the use of an
"in-person solicitor" a disciplinary ground.
Although it is possible that there are some
actions that fall within using "advertising
solicitors or free publicity press agents" but
not within using an "in-person solicitor", the