HARRY HUGHES, Governor

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interest is unrelated to the suppression of free speech; and
if the incidental restriction on the alleged First Amendment
freedoms is no greater than is essential to the furtherance
of that interest."

United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 377 (1968).

Whether the wearing and display of articles of
clothing, badges or other devices which express political
views is "pure speech" or is "symbolic speech," which is
closely akin to "pure speech," see Tinker at 505—506, the
restriction is permissible only if it furthers a substantial
or compelling governmental interest. It is undoubtedly true
that the State has such an interest in insuring the
integrity, efficiency, and order of the electoral process.
We do not doubt that forbidding electioneering, that is the
active solicitation of votes in or near polling places, as
in Sec. 24—23 (a) (4), furthers this interest. See Piper v.
Swan, 319 F.Supp. 908 (E.D. Tenn. 1970). However, as the
passive wearing and display of communicative clothing and
other items cannot ordinarily or reasonably be said to
disrupt the integrity, efficiency or order of the electoral
process, we conclude that this restriction does not further
this interest. Accordingly, we conclude that this
restriction on the expression of political views is an
abridgement of the right of free speech.

We would also point out that to the extent that this
bill, if enacted into law, might be used to exclude from the
polls voters who are wearing the offending articles of
clothing or badges, there would be a substantial question of
whether such an exclusion violated the Equal Protection
Clause of the 14th Amendment. This Clause forbids the
States to deny any person within its jurisdiction of the
equal protection of the law. While this Clause does not
forbid all discrimination, distinctions relating to such
fundamental interests as voting must generally serve a
compelling state interest. Hill v. Stone. 421 U.S. 289, 298
(1975). It is extremely doubtful if excluding voters based
on their attire, even if the attire has some political
significance, could even be said to serve a compelling state
interest.

Finally, aside from the substantive questions of
constitutional law, we would point out that the title is
defective. Although the bill was amended to forbid the
wearing and display of certain political advertising, the
title still refers to the wearing or display of such
advertising. Moreover, while this prohibition applies in or
near polling places, the title merely refers to prohibition
"in" polling places. Accordingly, we think that the bill
fails to fairly advise the reader of the subject of the bill
as required by Art. III, Sec. 29 of the State Constitution,