3164

VETOES

accepted as properly exercisable by the Congress as a
whole, then it would seem to be permissible for it to
delegate the power to some part of Congress. Indeed,
congressional committees can and do exercise power
ancillary to legislation within the sphere of activity
committed to then by Congress in other areas. In so
doing they make decisions independent of congressional
action as a whole which have policy significance, as
for example in deciding which of the many bills
referred to them to take up and consider, whether and
when to report matters to the floor, or how far to
carry an investigation. Of course the committees do
not have power to enact legislation in the
constitutional sense, but then neither does the
President nor a group of farmers. The political
desirability of giving this power to a committee or its
chairman may be doubted but this does not mean it is
constitutionally objectionable."

24   See also, 20 Op. Atty. Gen. 357 (1935) and 21 Op. Atty.
Gen. 387 (1936), advising that Joint Resolutions do not
require the approval of the Governor.

25   Hamilton v. State ex rel. Wells, 61 Md. 14 (1883).

26   This raises a subsidiary question, which we address
below, of whether the disapproval of a rule constitutes
the exercise of the judicial function.

27   "Administrative agencies are, in a very real sense, a
blend of all three branches of government; but their
creation and the extent of their powers rest
exclusively in the General Assembly. See generally 1
Davis, Administrative Law Treatise §1.09 (1958).

28   "The legislature may impose reasonable limitations on
the exercise of executive powers conferred by it on the
executive and not inherent in the office, and it may
limit and define the functions of the agencies created
by it."

29   The argument for a violation of the separations
principle also has been most forcefully put by R. W.
Ginnane.

30   Oppenheimer, supra, at 188, Cohen, Some Aspects of

Maryland Administrative Law, XXIV Md. L. Rev. 1, 3-8

(1964).

31   "See Crane v. Meginnis, 1 G. & J. 463 (1829) and Wright
v. Wright, 2 Md. 429, 452 (1852)."

32 "Administrative agencies have become a veritable fourth
branch of the Government, which has deranged our
three-branch legal theories much as the concept of a