BLAIR LEE III, Acting Governor

3157

legislative intent or beyond the authority of the
promulgating agency is a judicial power, which the
Legislature may not exercise. Compare, 63 Opinions of the

Attorney General 159, 164 (Wise. 1974); and Unpublished

Opinion of the Attorney General (Mich. 1953), cited at II

Opinions of the Attorney General 246, 251 (Mich. 1958), 38

both of which appear to have concerned the suspension of
existing rules.

In our opinion, this assertion fallaciously fails to
recognize the fundamental distinction between disapproving a
proposed rule and suspending one which has already taken
effect. While only that branch which is authorized to
exercise the judicial function may effectively suspend the
operation of a duly promulgated rule, the expression of an
opinion which is a statutorily required condition precedent
to the valid promulgation of a rule certainly is not
inherently judicial. For example, under the provisions of
Code, Article 31, §9, it has long been required that:

"[p]rior to the adoption of any rule or
regulation by an officer or department of the
executive branch of the State of Maryland, the
rule or regulation shall be submitted to the
Attorney General of Maryland for approval as to
its legality. * * * No rule or regulation
hereafter made, promulgated or adopted is
effective until after compliance with this
section."

Applied in Md. Tobacco Grower's Association v. Md. Tobacco
Authority, 267 Md. 20 (1972). Furthermore, although perhaps
administratively burdensome and of questionable wisdom, the
requirement for approval by two different authorities is not
of constitutional magnitude- See, 60 Opinions of the
Attorney General 771, 773-774 (1975).

Consequently, we agree with our colleague from
Tennessee, who while expressing the opinion that only the
Legislature may suspend duly promulgated rules and
regulations, nevertheless, also concluded:

"..., the Legislature may delegate to committees
or to a single committee the authority to review
rules and regulations before those rules and
regulations become effective. This power to
review, which would carry the power to veto those
rules and regulations found lacking, should be
clearly circumscribed so that the committees have
lucid guidelines within which to act. The power
to review and veto could run to rules and
regulations which the committees find to be
illegal, unreasonable or contrary to legislative
intent. There may be other criteria upon which
guidelines could be drawn. The ability to act