BLAIR LEE III, Acting Governor                        3155

Declaration of Rights is to be taken, upon this
reasoning, as having reference only to those
three orthodox parts of the Government and is,
therefore, not applicable to other subordinate
agencies.[31] It may be noted in passing, as a
commentary upon the vagaries of nomenclature,
that this line of thought invokes the so—called
strict interpretation of the Constitution to
attain a so-called liberal result."

Oppenheimer, supra, at 189. Thus, Mr. Justice White,
concurring in part and dissenting in part in Buckley v.
Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 280-281 (1976), observed:

"There is no doubt that the development of the
administrative agency in response to modern
legislative and administrative need has placed
severe strain on the separation—of—powers
principle in its pristine formulation. See
Kilbourn v. Thompson, 20 3 U.S. 168, 191, 26 L.Ed.
377 (1881). Any notion that the Constitution
bans any admixture of powers that might have been
deemed legislative, executive, and judicial has
had to give way. The independent agency has
survived attack from various directions: that it
exercises invalidly delegated legislative power;
Sunshine Coal Co. v. Adkins, 310 U.S. 381, 60
S.Ct. 907, 84 L.Ed. 1263 (1940); that it
invalidly exercises judicial power, ibid; and
that its functions are so executive in nature
that its members must be subject to Presidential
control, Humphrey's Executor v. United States,
295 U.S. 602, 55 S.Ct. 869, 79 L.Ed. 2d 1611
(1935)."

See also, Mr. Justice Jackson in   F.T.C. v. Ruberoid Co., 343

U.S. 470, 487-488 (1952),32     Davis, Administrative Law

Treatise, §1.09; Niles, Maryland Constitutional Law, 21-22
(1915);33 Cohen, supra.

Thus, the separation of powers mandated by Article 8
should invalidate the legislative veto no more than it does
the initial delegation of rule—making authority to the
administrative agency. Schwartz, supra, at 1043 (1955). If
Article 8 is not offended by the delegation of the
rule-making authority, surely it is not offended by the
qualification of that delegation. Opinion of the Justices,
66 A.2d 823, 826 (N.H. 1970).34 See also, Opinions of the
Attorney General (So. Dakota), Official Opinion No. 75-35;35
Opinion of the Attorney General (Tenn.) supra.36 Indeed,
essential to the constitutional validity of that delegated
rule-making authority is the concurrent obligation that it
be employed solely within the boundaries of that statutory
policy which the Legislature has endorsed. Comptroller of
the Treasury v. Rochill, Inc., supra, 205 Md. at 23 3. Thus,