BLAIR LEE III, Acting Governor

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General Assembly into the realm which the Constitution has
reserved to the Executive Branch alone.

In addressing this aspect of the separation of powers
question, the Court of Claims summarized the attack as
follows:

"The principal objections on this score are
rooted in plaintiffs' analysis that: (a)
legislative power 'to adjust salaries' once
delegated by Congress becomes an executive power,
and Congress can then no longer meddle in the
execution of that power; if Congress is
displeased with the results of the administration
of the power, it must act through a new statute;
(b) legislative veto in the Act abrogates the
President's constitutional duty to faithfully
execute the laws; (c) Congress can delegate
power, and can even delegate power with
conditions, but it cannot affix an
unconstitutional condition upon the delegation,
i.e., review or veto by one House; and (d) the
legislative veto involves Congress in day—to—Day
administration and hence expands the role of
legislators into administrators in violation of
article I, section 6, clause 2.

Atkins v. United States supra, 556 F.2d at 1066. See also,
Ginnane, supra; Watson, supra. Thereupon, observing that
the three branches of government necessarily share
constitutional powers because such powers cannot be neatly
ascribed for all time to one or another, the majority held:

"The nub of [plaintiff's ] ... argument stems from
a rigid segregation of powers into executive and
legislative, a categorization we deem
unilluminating in determining whether the
exercise of power by a given branch is
constitutional or not. If plaintiffs' contention
is that the only role of Congress is to legislate
and set policy, and having done so, necessarily
cedes all further review of the execution of that
policy, the position is untenable. He assume
that plaintiffs do not question the
long—established principle that Congress may seek
assistance from another branch of the Government
by delegating authority to the executive branch
or to administrative agencies under proper
standards, and thereby to direct the details of
the execution of the authority granted. Hampton

& Co. v. United States, 276 U.S. 394, 406, 48

S.Ct. 348, 72 L.Ed. 624 (1928). Unless Congress
invades a power specifically granted to the
President in the Constitution, such as the power
of appointment, or fails to provide guidelines,