BLAIR LEE III, Acting Governor

3151

policy.26 Therefore, what is at issue is not a "Bill" to
become "law," but the administrative fleshing out of an
existing "law," which itself was subject to the Executive
veto. Consequently, the approval or disapproval of the
regulation is no more distinct legislation, requiring a new
submission to the Governor, than is the promulgation of an
administrative regulation under present law, especially the
promulgation of an emergency rule, regulation or standard
which currently must be approved by the AELR Committee.
See, Code, Art. 40, §40A. Thirdly, even if the rejection of
a proposed administrative rule somehow constitutes
lawmaking, it certainly cannot be any more subject to the
presentments clause or the veto power than the rejection of
a proposed bill — and it is well settled that presentment
clauses do not operate with respect to proposed legislation
which has been rejected by a committee of either House, or
by a single House.

Thus, in our view, the rejection of a proposed
administrative rule presents neither of the mischiefs which
the presentment clauses were designed to obviate, viz.,
neither the opportunity for encroachment nor for hasty or
partial legislation. Accordingly, House Bill 619 does not,
at the very least, clearly contravene either Article II,
Sec. 17 or Article III, Sec. 30.

C. Separation of Powers: Executive and Legislative.
Article 8 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights commands:

"That the Legislative, Executive and Judicial
powers of Government ought to be forever separate
and distinct from each other; and no person
exercising the functions of one of said
Departments shall assume or discharge the duties
of any other."

Although "the legislative department is nearest to the
source of power, and is manifestly the predominant branch of
the government," Crane v. Maginnis, 1 G.S.J. 463, 47 2
(1829), it is now well settled that each branch is supreme
in its own realm, and that the purpose of this article is to
parcel out and separate the powers of government, and to
confine particular classes of them to particular branches of
the Supreme Authority, Wright v. Wright, 2 Md. 429, 452
(1852). It is also clear that Article 8 presents "a more
concrete barrier than any which the Supreme Court has had to
hurdle under the Federal Constitution." Oppenheimer,
Administrative Law in Maryland. II Md. L. Rev. 185, 188
(1938), cited with approval in Dept. of Natural Resources v.
Linchester, supra, at 218. Nevertheless, Article 8 does not
enjoin a complete separation of powers between the several
departments, McCrea v. Roberts, 89 Md. 238, 251 (1899) ;
Baltimore v. State, 15 Md. 376, 457 (1860). Thus, it is
generally recognized that there are no bright dividing lines
among the duties assigned each department; that to attach