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LAWS OF MARYLAND Ch. 13
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88
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which conforms more closely to the general
style and usage adopted in the various revised
articles — is no less expressive of and in no
way is intended to modify the Meaning and
intent of the present "shall not"; in this
regard, see, also, Art. 1, §26 of the Code.
The word "considered" - which, as used here,
conforms to the like usage in present Art.
89B, §211G-1(b)(6), now §3-309 of this title -
is substituted for "deemed" since, in the
negational context used here, the former more
accurately reflects the legislative intent
that the referenced obligations are not at all
to be considered or treated as unqualified
debts or unlimited pledges of the faith and
credit of this State (see discussion below);
the tern "deemed" more accurately is used in
the sense of creating a conclusive presumption
and, therefore, in the context of this
section, would carry with it the more limited,
unintended but literal, meaning: "may not be
conclusively presumed to be".
As to the effect of this section, see
Secretary v. Mancuso, 278 Md. 81 (1976). In
that case, the Secretary maintained that, in
light of Art. 94A, §9(b), the issuance and
sale of Consolidated Transportation Bonds did
not create a "debt" subject to the limitations
of Article III, §34 of the State Constitution;
he reasoned that: "[I]f the source of debt
service payment is expressly limited and not
tacked by [an unlimited pledge of] the State's
faith and credit, it is not a constitutional
debt....[Consequently,] there is no difference
between the Consolidated Transportation Bonds
and State revenue bonds payable solely from
non—tax revenues and not backed by the State's
faith and credit, which the Courts have held
not to constitute 'debt' under §34." Id., at
pp. 84-85. The Court of Appeals rejected this
argument; after reviewing the legislative
history behind §34, first formulated in
Article III, §22 of the constitution of 1851,
the Court concluded: "It is thus clear that
one of the purposes of the constitutional debt
provision (against maturities in excess of 15
years] was to guard against future credit
abuses by including within its purview any
evidence of State indebtedness which is
secured by its taxing power." Id., at p. 86.
Therefore, the use—albeit limited—-of the
taxing authority of the State for debt service
payment creates a constitutional "debt" of the
State under Article III, §34. Id., at p. 91.
The Court's decision does not, however,
vitiate the provisions of former Art. 94A,
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