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3790
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VETOES
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requires this, an abundance of caution might suggest that
the State should request, and the trial judge should
either request or require, that the jury make at least
these three general findings. 13 Of course, the fact that
the statute may not require either these general findings
or specific written findings of fact such as are required
of the trial judge should in no way preclude the State
from requesting the jury to make specific findings or the
court from requesting or requiring it to do so. Such
specific findings can only be of assistance to both the
trial judge and to the Court of Appeals in the event of
appellate review.
7. Your inquiry as to whether, if the jury
recommends death and makes specific findings as to the
various circumstances, the court may adopt its findings
as its own can be answered with a simple "yes." If the
jury does make such findings and they are sufficiently
specific to comply with the the requirements imposed upon
the trial judge by Section 413(e) and the judge agrees
with each and every one of those findings, then we see no
reason why he may not adopt them as his own.
8. Your final specific question is directed to
aggravating circumstances (1) and (6) as set forth in
§413(f). You ask if a person released on parole would
still be considered as being "under sentence of
confinement to any correctional institution in this
State" (1), or if applicable "under sentence of life
imprisonment." 14
Turning first to aggravating circumstance (1), we
note that it applies to a defendant who committed a
murder "at a time when he was confined or under sentence
of confinement to any correctional institution in this
State." Since a person actually incarcerated and serving
under a sentence of confinement would clearly be
"confined" within the meaning of the statute, we believe
that the "under sentence of confinement" language must
have been included so as to apply to a person released on
parole or otherwise under such a sentence but not
actually confined. Limiting the "under sentence of
confinement" phrase so as to apply only during actual
confinement would tend to reduce it to the status of a
redundancy and mere surplusage. Such constructions are
not favored. Similarly, we believe that the phrase
"under a sentence of life imprisonment" in aggravating
circumstance (6) would apply to a person sentenced to
life imprisonment who had been released on parole.
Indeed, the memorandum prepared by your legislative
office submitted to the General Assembly in February,
1977, in connection with the Administration Bill stated
in part that the purpose of this particular language when
it was first enacted in 1975 "was to deter the commission
of a murder by a person who was paroled from a life
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