|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
3786
|
|
|
|
|
|
VETOES
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
penalty sentencing proceedings if considered relevant and
of probative value to the sentencing issues.
A confession or statement which was obtained by
coercion, force or threats or in any other involuntary
manner would, of course, be obtained in violation of the
Constitution and therefore could not be used in either
the sentencing proceeding or at the guilt stage of trial.
There may, however, be situations in which evidence
obtained in clear violation of constitutional rights may
be utilized for impeachment purposes at the guilt stage
of trial. Walder v. United States, 347 U. S. 62 (1954)
(Fourth Amendment violation). When the same jury hears
both the guilt stage of trial as well as the death
penalty sentencing proceeding, it could be argued that
the jury has been fatally tainted by hearing evidence
during the guilt stage of the proceedings which may not
be introduced during the sentencing stage even though the
judge may have given appropriate limiting instructions.
In short, it is impossible to state with precision
whether the exclusionary provisions at lines 146-148 of
the Bill would invariably exclude evidence otherwise
admissible at trial on the issue of guilt, for such
questions must be resolved on a case by case
interpretation based on the facts involved.
4. New §413(c) requires that any recommendation
of the jury for the imposition of the death penalty must
be its unanimous decision, but also provides that a life
sentence may be recommended upon a majority decision of
the jury. You correctly point out that it is possible
for a jury to be in a position to recommend the death
penalty by majority action but not unanimously, and
conversely, be unable to obtain the concurrence of a
majority of its members for a recommendation of a life
sentence. In essence, this would present the trial judge
with a "hung jury" unable to secure the concurrence of
the requisite number of its members for either of the two
permissible verdicts. You ask what effect or result
would follow if the jury is thus unable to recommend a
sentence or if it attempts to recommend the death penalty
by a majority but less than unanimous vote.
Clearly a less than unanimous recommendation of a
death penalty would not constitute a valid recommendation
under the plain language of the statute and presumably
would not be in accordance with instructions given by the
trial judge. Such a recommendation would be tantamount
to no recommendation at all. If, after receiving further
appropriate instructions from the trial court as to the
necessity for any recommendation of death to be unanimous
or any recommendation of life imprisonment to be by
majority decision, and instructions as to the
consequences of the jury's failure to make a valid
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
 |
