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3780
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VETOES
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procedure which permits the sentencing judge or jury to
focus on both the circumstances of the offense and the
individual defendant, with the opportunity to consider
the character and record of the defendant with particular
reference to mitigating factors, and (3) meaningful
appellate review which permits a comparison of the
sentence with the penalties imposed in similar cases
throughout the State. Based upon these factors we
believe Senate Bill 106 meets these basic requirements
and would pass constitutional scrutiny on its face.
He must recognize that all death penalty or other
sentencing statutes could be found, in particular cases
or classes of cases, to have been unconstitutionally
applied. However, with respect to Senate Bill 106, we
believe that the statutory directions to the sentencing
authority to objectively consider the nature of the
offense (the aggravating circumstances), and more
importantly the mitigating factors applicable to the
particular person and to the circumstances of the
criminal action in question, provide the basic type of
focus and guidance deemed to be of the utmost importance
by the Supreme Court. Use of the bifurcated proceeding
with imposition of the death penalty limited to those
cases where specified aggravating circumstances were
established, coupled with provisions for a trial court
report and automatic, expedited appellate review,
represents the general scheme regarded by the Supreme
Court as preferable from the constitutional viewpoint.
Accordingly, we conclude that Senate Bill 106 would, on
its face meet the constitutional tests of Gregg v.
Georgia, supra, and its companion Supreme Court cases. 3
We turn now to the specific questions that you have
raised in your letter requesting our opinion on Senate
Bill 106 and to some additional features of the Bill
which we feel require comment at this time.
1. You first asked whether in the event any
provision of the Bill is found to be unconstitutional or
is otherwise defective, that portion can be severed from
the remainder of the Bill and the balance validly
implemented. Under the general rules of severability as
discussed more fully below, and under the specific ruling
of the Court of Appeals of Maryland in Blackwell v.
State, supra, it is clear that unconstitutional and
otherwise defective provisions of the Bill may be severed
from the constitutional and valid portions of the Bill so
long as the remaining portions of the statute are
sufficient to carry out the original legislative intent.
Shell Oil Co. v. Supervisor, 276 Md. 236, 248 (1975).
Under the provisions of Article 1, §23, Md. Code
Ann., all statutes enacted after July 1, 1973 are deemed
severable unless the statute itself specifically provides
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